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Abstract
We study dynamic international agreements when: one of the negotiating parties faces a
threat of electoral replacement during negotiations; agreements made before the election
are the starting point for any subsequent renegotiation; and governments cannot commit to
future negotiation strategies. Conflicts of interest between governments may be softened or
intensified by the governments’ conflicts of interest with voters. We characterize when the
threat of electoral turnover strengthens the prospect for successful negotiations, when it may
cause negotiations to fail, and how it affects the division of the surplus from cooperation.
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“I decided rather than terminating NAFTA... we will renegotiate. Now, if I’m
unable to make a fair deal, if I’m unable to make a fair deal for the United States,
meaning a fair deal for our workers and our companies, I will terminate NAFTA.
But we’re going to give renegotiation a good, strong shot.”
President Trump, April 27 2017
1. Introduction
States sign treaties, accede to international institutions and organizations, and lend
money to other states. The division of the surplus arising from these activities is negotiated
by the governments of the day. However, these governments may, in turn, be replaced by
new governments over the life of the agreement. This raises the possibility that arrangements
signed by today’s administrations may not be honored by their successors.
In fact, newly-elected governments often try to renegotiate a predecessor’s agreement. A
Conservative government took the United Kingdom into the European Economic Community
(EEC) in 1973. That same year the Labour Party declared that it “opposes British member-
ship [in the EEC] on the terms negotiated by the Conservative Government”, and its 1974
election manifesto promised to “seek a fundamental re-negotiation”.4 Upon entering govern-
ment in 1974, Labour re-opened negotiations, obtaining concessions in exchange for the UK’s
continued participation. In 2016 a Conservative government initiated the renegotiation that
culminated in a vote for the UK to exit the European Union (“Brexit”). In May 2017, the
Trump administration notified Congress that it plans to renegotiate the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). And, in June 2017, Donald Trump withdrew the United States
from the Paris Climate accord, with the prime intent to renegotiate better terms, asserting,
“In order to fulfill my solemn duty to protect America and its citizens, the
United States will withdraw from the Paris climate accord but begin negotiations
to reenter either the Paris accord or an entirely new transaction on terms that
are fair to the United States.”
International negotiations may polarize and even dominate domestic politics. In March
2010, the European Central Bank, EU and IMF (the “Troika”) established emergency loan
agreements to Greece. The first Greek bailout was negotiated between the Troika and the
centre-left PASOK government, which held a parliamentary majority of fewer than ten seats
and hence faced an ongoing threat of electoral replacement over the life of the agreement. A
4The first quote is from Labour’s Programme for Britain (1973), and the second is from the Labour
Party’s February 1974 general election manifesto.
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domestic power transition to an anti-bailout party could threaten the agreement’s survival;
and the perceived harshness of the initial terms could itself increase the chance of a more
hostile future government via voters’ dissatisfaction with the agreement. Both risks were re-
alized: in the next election, PASOK lost one hundred and nineteen seats, while Syriza—the
radical left-wing party that staunchly opposed the bailout terms—became the second largest
party. And, in January 2015, Syriza came to power on the back of the Greek electorate’s
hostility to the austerity measures. The new Greek government immediately re-opened nego-
tiations with EU member states that nearly led Greece to exit the European Monetary Union.
In the context of a renegotiation, the effective bargaining power of a government typically
derives from its relative willingness to walk away from an existing agreement, either in ac-
cordance with an exit process stipulated in the agreement itself, or by simply abrogating the
terms.5 This was manifest in the unilateral decision by the Bush Administration to withdraw
from the Kyoto Protocol in 2001, and in 2017 when the Trump Administration threatened to
“terminate” NAFTA absent a renegotiation that would deliver a “fair deal” for the United
States.6 Indeed, when Margaret Thatcher renegotiated a two-thirds rebate of Britain’s con-
tribution to the budget of the European Economic Community, in 1984, she is reported
to have succeeded only by threatening to withhold all of Britain’s contribution unless her
demands were met.7 The revised British contribution remained in place until 2005.8
In this paper, we ask: how do pending national elections determine (a) the prospects for
initial cooperation between states, and (b) the division of the surplus from an agreement?
And, how do the terms of an initial agreement affect the prospect of electoral replacement,
the bargaining attitude of a potential successor, or the risk that a successor will ultimately
walk away from the agreement?
In our model, at each of two dates, a domestic government negotiates an agreement with
a foreign government. The agreement specifies both whether a binary policy project is un-
dertaken and the extent of any transfers to be exchanged between governments in exchange
for implementing the project. The transfers could be interpreted as budget contributions,
rebates or regulatory carve-outs. All agents hold commonly-known initial valuations of the
5The Treaty of Lisbon introduced an explicit procedure for a member country of the EU to exit.
6see https://goo.gl/UlBqBM.
7See Future Financing of the European Union, (6th Report session 2004-05, HL Paper 62, page 21, Q68).
8Power-sharing arrangements between central and peripheral governments within states are also subject
to the threat of renegotiation, influenced by the threat or realization of electoral success by nationalist and
secessionist regional parties, resulting in partial devolution of policymaking (e.g., Catalonia or the Basque
State in Spain; Quebec in Canada influenced by the Parti Quebecois; Scotland in Great Britain, influenced
by the Scottish Nationalist Party; or the Flemish Community and Walloon Region in Belgium). The
terms governing the division of policymaking responsibilities weigh heavily on elections; and anticipation
of possible renegotiations after future elections weigh on the current devolution of policymaking. We thank
Laurent Bouton for these observations.
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project. The initial domestic incumbent is intrinsically either relatively friendly or relatively
hostile, but we assume that neither domestic party initially would prefer to implement the
project without some concessions from the foreign government.
After the initial negotiations conclude, a national election determines whether the incum-
bent is retained, or replaced by the other party. We first assume that the uncertainty over who
will hold power at date two is unaffected by date-one outcomes. We then assume that voters
cast their ballots for whichever party is best for them given the agreement that was initially
negotiated. Following elections, domestic agents receive a stochastic and publicly-observed
shock to their preferences over the project. For example, there may be civil unrest that raises
the domestic political cost of the project regardless of which political party holds power.
At date two, the transfer negotiated before the election serves as the transfer that would
be made if the new domestic government again implements the project. However, either
the foreign or domestic government may renegotiate the existing terms by proposing a new
transfer. If accepted by the other government, the proposed transfer replaces the standing
offer; but if rejected, the initial transfer remains in place. The foreign government then makes
the prevailing transfer if and only if the date-2 domestic government implements the project.
We explore how the prospect for initial agreements, and the division of the surplus varies
with (a) the preferences of the date-1 domestic government, (b) uncertainty about the prefer-
ences of a future domestic government, (c) uncertainty about the preferences of the domestic
electorate, and (d) how agents discount future outcomes.
Obviously, if agents care only for the short-term, the foreign government wants to make
the smallest date-one transfer that induces the domestic government to undertake the project.
But, suppose that agents care about future outcomes, and consider the future consequences
of an initial agreement. When a future domestic government takes power, it may want to
negotiate a larger transfer than what it inherited. But whether the foreign government would
agree to a larger transfer depends on the credibility of the domestic government’s threat to
abandon the project based on the existing terms—the more primitively hostile is the date-two
domestic government to the project, the greater is the set of circumstances in which it would
be willing to walk away from the existing agreement. A more hostile future government (a) re-
duces date-two surplus, but (b) raises the prospect that the domestic government successfully
negotiates a larger share of the surplus. This fundamental tension bears on all of our results.
When the election outcome is unaffected by initial negotiations, we prove that the two
governments reach an agreement if and only if the immediate (date-one) total surplus from
the project is positive. That is: static and dynamic conditions for an agreement coincide.
Moreover, agreements always feature the smallest transfer that induces the date-one domes-
tic government to implement the reform project. Thus, beliefs about who will hold power in
the future are irrelevant for whether an initial deal is signed, and for how the surplus from
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agreement is divided between the governments.
Matters are very different when domestic voters select their date-two domestic represen-
tative taking into account initial negotiation outcomes. More hostile domestic governments
can more credibly threaten to walk away from an existing agreement. This raises the prospect
of appropriating more of the surplus, and the attractiveness of electing a government that
is more intrinsically hostile to the project. But, when representatives are more hostile to
the project than voters, the mis-aligned interests also raise the prospect that the date-two
domestic government wants to terminate the project under conditions where voters want it
to continue. This raises the attractiveness of electing a more project-friendly government.
How voters resolve this trade-off depends on the date-one outcome. Greater initial policy
concessions by the foreign government mitigate the desire of domestic voters to appoint a
radical date-two government in order to extract even more. Instead, voters resolve to elect
a government that is more likely to maintain the project. But if voters believe that the
foreign government would be willing to offer far more concessions than are presently on the
table, they prefer a more hostile government—regardless of their primitive preferences over
the project, all voters share a common desire to extract as much surplus as possible from the
foreign government. Thus, initial negotiations are both affected by, and partly determine,
the outcome of the election and subsequent negotiation outcomes.
Our main findings are as follows. If the domestic government is initially relatively friendly,
date-one agreements may be signed even when the static surplus between the domestic and
foreign governments is negative. The reason is that the governments’ static conflicts of in-
terest are attenuated by a dynamic confluence of interests: both governments value more
generous standing agreements that encourage voters to return the friendly party to office.
This common interest may lead to even more generous offers by the foreign government than
are needed to secure the friendly government’s participation. Thus, national elections not
only raise the prospect of agreements, but re-direct surplus away from the foreign government
and toward the national government.
If, instead, the domestic government is initially relatively hostile, agreements may some-
times not be signed even when the static surplus between the domestic and foreign gov-
ernments is positive. The reason is that the governments’ static conflicts of interest are
exacerbated by a dynamic conflict of interests: more generous transfers harm the relatively
hostile incumbent by reducing the prospect that it retains power, since voters then favor a
friendly future government that will preserve the agreement. Finally, whenever an agreement
is signed, the foreign government appropriates all of the surplus from agreement.
More generally, dynamic considerations have a polarizing effect on initial negotiations:
static conflicts between the national and foreign government are magnified by other conflicts,
including (1) policy and rent-seeking conflicts between the domestic political parties, (2) pol-
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icy conflicts between the parties and the electorate, and (3) the policy conflict between the
foreign government and the electorate. We show how changes in the project valuations of the
domestic parties may drive more or less generous agreements, depending on the uncertainty
about domestic voters’ attitudes towards the project. Finally, we examine the robustness of
our results when voters can choose from a larger set of political parties, or when voters cast
ballots based on retrospective rather than prospective considerations, or when parties can
make limited commitments to their negotiation strategies conditional on winning office.
Our model offers novel insights into how domestic politics affect international negotia-
tions. First, democratic governments should be most successful in extracting concessions
from negotiating partners when elections are imminent. This finding is consistent with ev-
idence in Rickard and Caraway (2014) that labor market reforms demanded in exchange for
IMF financing are less stringent for loans negotiated within six months of a pending election.
Second, hawkish governments that are the most ideologically opposed to international agree-
ments have electoral incentives to secure less generous deals. A forward-looking electorate
responds to a favorable status quo by appointing less risky governments that are more likely
to preserve it—i.e., more project-friendly parties. So, a hawkish incumbent that uses its
leverage to secure better agreements hastens its departure from office! This may provide
insight into why, despite Syriza’s failure to negotiate more favorable terms from the Troika,
it retained its position as the largest parliamentary party in the subsequent election.
Our work relates to literatures on (1) agreements between states, (2) delegated bargain-
ing, and (3) the political economy of dynamic policy commitment.
Schelling (1980) argued that stringent domestic treaty ratifications strengthen an execu-
tive’s external bargaining position by creating “a manifest inability to make concessions and
meet demands”(Schelling, 1980, 19). Putnam (1988) subsequently expounded the metaphor
of international and domestic politics as ‘two-level games’, focusing on ratification proce-
dures at the domestic level. A focus on elections, rather than ratification, distinguishes our
analysis from the body of work that followed Putnam. This distinction matters: a ratifier
chooses between accepting an international agreement and preserving the status quo; while
voter choices reflect their induced preferences over the anticipated bargaining outcomes that
their representatives will achieve after the election. Once authority is delegated, voters no
longer influence negotiation outcomes and cannot trigger a reversion to an outside option.
In the context of international and domestic politics, and in related economic contexts,
several papers explore the induced preferences of voters over the negotiator (e.g., govern-
ment or legislator) that will bargain on their behalf, including Persson, Tabellini et al. (1992),
Segendorff (1998), Besley and Coate (2003), Gradstein (2004), Buchholz, Haupt and Peters
(2005) and Harstad (2008). These models are, however, static: negotiations take place only
after voters have made their delegation decisions. In our dynamic setting, negotiations take
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place both before and after elections (i.e., delegation decisions). Our contribution is to show
how initial negotiation strategies are driven by the negotiators’ conflicting interests in shap-
ing voters’ induced preferences over representatives who will have an opportunity to negotiate
again in the future. We further show how these considerations may drive the possibility for
initial agreements and how the associated surplus is divided between the initial negotiators.
Smith and Hayes (1997) also study a setting in which countries may renegotiate an
inherited pre-election agreement. They characterize renegotiation outcomes after an election
for a given inherited status quo. However, they do not derive the equilibrium agreements
that lead to that status quo, nor do they identify the conditions under which pre-election
agreements are reached—that are central to our analysis. Battaglini and Harstad (2016)
show how an incumbent party might choose inefficiently low sanctions (a “weak treaty”) to
differentiate itself electorally from a challenger.
In our model, initial agreements alter how future governments trade off the outside option
from quitting an agreement with the inside option from maintaining the inherited agreement.
The initial agreements thus serve as partial commitment devices. The idea that today’s poli-
cies commit future governments—and that such commitments can be used to manipulate
electoral preferences—is well established, for example in Alesina and Tabellini (1990), Milesi-
Ferretti and Spolaore (1994) and Persson and Svensson (1989). In our setting, however, the
degree of commitment itself is entirely endogenous. In particular, initial negotiation out-
comes change neither the technology available to future governments, nor their primitive
valuation from post-election participation in the project. Our mechanism, instead, is that
different future governments will have different tolerances for maintaining an existing agree-
ment rather than unilaterally quitting. All agents anticipate that more hostile governments
have a greater propensity to walk away from standing offers, but for the same reasons are less
likely maintain an agreement in the same circumstances as a more friendly government. The
balance of these trade-offs—and voters’ relative concern for each component—is shaped by
the relative generosity of the standing offer. Fully endogenizing the degree of commitment
inherent in the initial policy outcome is a core contribution of this paper.
The paper’s outline is as follows. We present our base model, analyzing a setting in
which the uncertainty over who will hold future domestic political power does not hinge
on the initial negotiation between the foreign and domestic government. We then consider
endogenous elections, showing how the answers to our motivating questions change radically
vis a` vis a setting with exogenous turnover. We show how offers vary with primitives such as
the intrinsic valuations that the domestic parties place on the project, as well as uncertainty
about voters’ preferences. We then summarize a raft of extensions that are fully analyzed
in the Appendix. A conclusion follows. Proofs are in the Appendix.
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2. Model
Our two-date economy features two countries, a foreign government (FG) and a date-t
domestic government (DGt). FG can be interpreted either as an individual government or a
group of governments such as the European Union, or an international organization such as
the International Monetary Fund. There is a project that the governments can undertake at
each of dates 1 and 2; rt = 1 indicates that the project is undertaken at date t, and rt = 0
indicates that it is not. The project could represent the domestic country’s accession to
an international organization such as the EU, the launch of a common currency, a climate
agreement, or a region’s participation in a federation or national union.
At both dates, the project generates a value vF for FG. The value of the project to DGt
depends on the identity of the political party that holds power. We consider a two-party set-
ting that features a relatively friendly party with date-1 valuation v, and a relatively hostile
party with date-1 valuation v. These project valuations can be interpreted as flow payoffs
enjoyed at each date from the moment that the agreement is signed. If the project is not un-
dertaken at date t, each agent receives a date-t payoff that we normalize to zero. All project
valuations are common knowledge. Assumption 1 sets out the structure that the foreign
government derives a higher value from the project than the relatively friendly government,
which, in turn, derives a higher value from the project than the relatively hostile party.
Assumption 1: vF > v > v.
All agents weight date-1 payoffs by 1− δ ∈ (0, 1) and date-2 payoffs by δ. For example,
1 − δ could represent the time between the initial signing and the next election: when δ is
large, negotiations take place relatively close to the election, after which there will be an
opportunity to renegotiate the initial agreement.
At the outset of negotiations, participation by DG1 in the project with FG implies a trans-
fer s1 ∈ R from FG to DG1. In the EU accession example, s1 ≥ 0 could represent a standard
package of benefits, such as tariff reductions or a share of regional development funds that is
awarded to a new member state upon joining. By contrast, s1 < 0 could reflect formula-based
budgetary contributions made by the domestic government in exchange for its participation
in the project. Alternatively, it could reflect monetary or fiscal convergence criteria that DG1
must satisfy in order to accede, such as the Stability and Growth Pact. The precise value of
s1—and whether it is positive or negative—does not play a role in our results. We focus on the
most interesting setting, in which neither the relatively friendly nor relatively hostile party
derives a positive date-1 value from entering into an agreement on these terms, and in which
FG derives a strictly positive date-1 value from the project taking place at the initial terms:
Assumption 2: v + s1 < 0, vF − s1 > 0.
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We allow, however, for negotiations between the countries in which FG encourages DGt
to participate by offering more favorable terms. These negotiations unfold as follows. At
date 1, FG is the proposer, and DG1 is the receiver.
9 FG makes an initial offer b1 ≥ s1,
which is a concession that it will give to DG1 if and only if it participates in the agreement
at that date.10 In the EU accession example, b1 could represent additional concessions and
carve-outs on labor market or financial sector regulations, budget contributions, or a more
generous share of regional development funds. After receiving the offer b1, DG1 chooses
r1(b1) ∈ {0, 1}, where r1(b1) = 1 indicates that the project is implemented at date 1 and
r1(b1) = 0 indicates that it is not.
Between dates 1 and 2, the date-1 domestic government DG1 may be replaced by a new
domestic government DG2, according to a process that we describe below. After DG2 is real-
ized, all domestic agents are hit by a common additive preference shock λ to the payoffs they
derive from the project. We assume that this publicly-observed preference shock is drawn
from a uniform distribution with support [−σ, σ]. This shock can capture an unanticipated
worsening of the economy—unemployment may increase, labor unions may organize indus-
trial unrest or there may be civil unrest. Alternatively, new information may come to light.
For example, in 2004, an audit by the incoming Greek government found that, under a pre-
vious PASOK administration, the government’s statistics agency had mis-reported the coun-
try’s debt and deficit figures in order to qualify for entry into the European single currency.
We first assume that date-1 negotiations do not affect the outcome of the domestic elec-
tion. Thus, DG2 is relatively hostile with exogenous probability Pr(v) ∈ [0, 1], and relatively
friendly with probability Pr(v) = 1 − Pr(v). This captures a benchmark in which the elec-
tion outcome is insensitive to the negotiation outcome. We later endogenize DG2’s project
valuation via an election, where electoral outcomes may depend on: (1) whether the project
was implemented at date 1, and the terms of the initial bargain; (2) how voters make voting
decisions (prospectively or retrospectively); and (3) the set of feasible replacements. We
assume that there is sufficient variation in the domestic preference shock λ:
Assumption 3: vF + v < σ, v + s1 > −σ.
Assumption 3 says that there is enough uncertainty about the common shock λ to do-
mestic preferences, that (a) it could exceed the expected surplus from the project between
FG and the relatively project-friendly DG2 with valuation v; and (b) it could be even lower
than the expected value for the relatively hostile DG2 with valuation v from participating
9In the Appendix, we show that our results extend when DG1 is instead the proposer.
10Throughout, we restrict FG to proposing weakly more generous terms than s1. This restriction is
without loss of generality under many mild restrictions, for example that s1 + σ+ v is not too large and the
likelihood that the median domestic voter places a very high value on the project is not too high.
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in the project at the initial standing offer, s1.
After λ is realized, the initial terms for the project can be renegotiated, or if agreement
was not reached at date 1, the governments can try again. The inherited date-1 terms serve
as the reversion point s2 for date-2 bargaining. Thus, if the project was implemented at date
1 with transfer b1, the status-quo transfer is s2 = b1; this transfer will be made at date 2 if the
project is again implemented and new terms are not agreed upon. For example, Thatcher’s
renegotiation of Britain’s EU budget rebate persisted from 1984 until 2005. If, instead, the
project was not implemented at date 1, then the status quo transfer (i.e., starting point for
date-2 negotiations in which the governments try again) is s2 = s1.
With probability θ ∈ [0, 1], DG2 proposes the new terms, and with probability 1− θ the
FG makes the proposal. The parameter θ could reflect intrinsic bargaining power or institu-
tional features of the agreement that determine who can initiate renegotiations. We allow for
arbitrary θ ∈ [0, 1] to emphasize that results do not depend sensitively on the distribution
of future bargaining power.11 The agent realized as proposer at date 2 can propose a new
transfer, b2 ∈ R. If the date-2 receiver accepts, this becomes the new date-2 transfer. Other-
wise, the inherited terms from past negotiations remain in force, so that b2 = s2. Next, DG2
decides whether to quit the agreement and receive its outside option of zero or to execute
the agreement given the date-two terms. FG then makes the agreed-upon transfer if and
only if DG2 executes the agreement by implementing the project.
The expected lifetime payoff of a domestic agent with date-1 project valuation v is:
(1− δ)r1(v + b1) + δ
∑
v′∈{v,v}
Pr(v′)
σ∫
−σ
r2(v + b2 + λ)f(λ) dλ,
where f(λ) is the density of the domestic preference shock, λ. Here r1 ∈ {0, 1} is the date-1
domestic government’s initial decision to implement the project (r1 = 1) or not (r1 = 0); and
r2 ∈ {0, 1} denotes the project outcome at date 2; and b2 denotes the date-two transfer from
FG when the project is implemented at date 2, i.e., when r2 = 1. Note that domestic agents
care about date-2 policy outcomes regardless of who holds office at that date. In addition to
deriving project-related payoffs like any other domestic agent, we assume that each domestic
political party derives an office-holding benefit of w > 0 at any date that it holds office.
11That is, θ does not play an important role in our analysis. Nonetheless, scholars have considered how
features of international institutions—such as re-negotiation protocols—might be chosen to maximize the
prospect that an agreement survives (see, e.g., Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001) or Koremenos (2001)).
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The analogous expected payoff of FG with project valuation vF is:
(1− δ)r1(vF − b1) + δ
∑
v′∈{v,v}
Pr(v′)
σ∫
−σ
r2(vF − b2)f(λ) dλ.
One may observe that FG’s project valuation does not evolve over time. This assumption
eases presentation and analysis, allowing us to focus on the effects of uncertainty about
DG2’s valuation v
2
D. One can also interpret the foreign government as the IMF or the World
Bank, whose leadership is not expected to change over the course of negotiations.
3. Policy Outcomes at Date Two
We start by analyzing the long-term consequences of date-1 outcomes. If the project
was implemented at date 1, i.e., if r1 = 1, then the status quo transfer s2 is the transfer b1
that DG1 accepted. If the project was not implemented, i.e., if r1 = 0, then the status quo
transfer that serves as the starting point for date-2 negotiations is s2 = s1.
Because there are no bargaining frictions, the project will be implemented at the terminal
date t = 2 if and only if the associated surplus is positive, i.e., if and only if
v2D + λ+ vF ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ λ ≥ −(v2D + vF ). (1)
Even though the date-2 implementation decision does not depend on date-1 actions, the di-
vision of the surplus depends on (a) the status quo transfer and (b) the shock realization λ.
Suppose, first, that DG2 has a high enough project valuation v
2
D+λ that it would receive
a positive payoff from implementing the project when it receives the status-quo transfer s2:
v2D + λ+ s2 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ λ ≥ −(v2D + s2). (2)
With probability θ ∈ [0, 1], DG2 is recognized to propose a modification to the inherited
terms, s2. Because DG2 prefers higher transfers, it never proposes a transfer b2 < s2. Fur-
ther, a proposal that raises the transfer to any b2 > s2 will fail: when (2) holds, FG recognizes
that DG2 will implement the project even when the initial agreement is not amended. As a
result, FG would reject the amendment, because a threat by DG2 to renege on the inherited
agreement is not credible.
With residual probability 1 − θ, FG is recognized to propose a modification. Although
FG would like to negotiate a reduced transfer, DG2 will refuse such amendments—it prefers
to maintain the existing terms, which offer more favorable concessions in exchange for im-
plementing the project.
Suppose, instead, that DG2 anticipates a negative value from implementing the project
at the status-quo transfer, i.e., (2) fails. This means that it would prefer not to implement
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the project at date 2 unless the initial terms were amended to a higher transfer. Suppose,
first, that the surplus from agreement is positive, i.e., (1) holds.
With probability θ, DG2 gets to propose a modification to the inherited terms. If FG
rejects the proposal, the project will end when (2) does not hold, giving FG a payoff of
zero. Thus, DG2 can re-negotiate the date-2 transfer from s2 to the larger transfer b2 = vF .
That FG is held to its participation constraint is not essential—what matters is that there
is a discontinuity in the terms that DG2 can obtain when its threat to break the existing
agreement is credible, i.e., at the threshold on λ defined in (2).
With probability 1 − θ, FG is, instead, recognized. Since (2) fails, FG must offer DG2
a larger transfer to secure its participation. It therefore raises the transfer from s2 to
b2 = −(v2D +λ). These terms leave DG2 with value v2D +λ indifferent between implementing
the project and quitting, allowing FG to claim the remainder of the surplus for itself.
Finally, if the date-2 surplus from agreement is negative, i.e., if (1) does not hold, then
no amendment will be agreed upon, as the joint surplus from implementing the project is
negative. The project will not be implemented and all agents receive date-one payoffs of zero.
Thus, the expected date-2 project payoff of a domestic agent with date-1 project valua-
tion v who anticipates that the date-2 domestic government will have project valuation v2D
and face status quo transfer s2 is:
VD(v, v
2
D, s2) =
σ∫
−(v2D+s2)
(v + s2 + λ)f(λ) dλ+
−(v2D+s2)∫
−(v2D+vF )
(v − v2D + θ(v2D + λ+ vF ))f(λ) dλ.
(3)
The expected date-2 project payoff of the foreign government FG given s2 when it faces DG2
with valuation v2D is:
VF (v
2
D, s2) =
σ∫
−(v2D+s2)
(vF − s2)f(λ) dλ+
−(v2D+s2)∫
−(v2D+vF )
(1− θ)(v2D + λ+ vF )f(λ) dλ. (4)
A transfer of power from a friendly date-1 domestic government DG1 to a more hostile date-
2 domestic government DG2 (i.e., from v to v) carries two implications. First, it increases
the prospect that DG2 can renegotiate the initial terms to a more favorable arrangement.
Second, it lowers the total surplus of the date-2 negotiating parties. As a result, there will
be situations in which a hostile DG2 will fail to reach an agreement with FG in contexts
where a more project-friendly DG2 would have successfully concluded the negotiation.
Discussion: The bargaining protocol is more stark than necessary for our main results.
What is crucial is that the terms that the domestic government obtains at date 2 improve as
11
its valuation of the project falls, relative to the status quo offer. This improvement in terms
holds regardless of the distribution of date-2 bargaining power, θ ∈ [0, 1]. When the domestic
government holds date-2 proposal power, a more hostile representative can renegotiate the
status quo transfer from s2 up to b2 = vF . When, instead, the foreign government holds pro-
posal power, its offer holds the date-2 domestic government to its participation constraint,
but its transfer b2 = −(v2D + λ) still increases as the domestic government becomes more
hostile, i.e., as v2D decreases. A more hostile representative not only captures the upside of
larger concessions—it also mitigates against the downside of subsequent appropriation.
4. Policy Outcomes at Date One
Exogenous Power Transitions. In our benchmark setting, the valuation of the date-2
domestic government (DG2) does not hinge on the date-1 policy outcome. At date 1, the
foreign government FG makes a proposal to the domestic government DG1, which is either
relatively friendly, with value v1D = v, or relatively hostile, with value v
1
D = v. DG1 accepts
the offer, i.e., chooses r1(b1) = 1, if and only if:
(1− δ)(v1D + b1) + δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)
[
1[v2D = v
1
D]w + VD(v
1
D, v
2
D, b1)
]
≥ (1− δ)0 + δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)
[
1[v2D = v
1
D]w + VD(v
1
D, v
2
D, s1)
]
, (5)
where we recall that w is the office rent that is enjoyed if and only if the incumbent is
reelected, i.e., v2D = v
1
D. Thus, the foreign government’s date-1 proposal solves:
max
b1≥s1
(1− δ)r1(b1)(vF − b1) + δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)VF (v
2
D, r1(b1)b1 + (1− r1(b1))s1),
subject to the participation constraint that r1(b1) = 1 if (5) holds, and r1(b1) = 0, otherwise.
Proposition 1. When the identity of the date-2 domestic government does not depend on
the date-1 agreement, the project is implemented at date 1 if and only if the date-1 surplus
is positive, i.e., v1D + vF ≥ 0. Further, if the project is implemented at date 1, the foreign
government extracts all surplus, offering the transfer that satisfies (5).
Strikingly, uncertainty about who will hold future domestic power has no effect on both
(1) whether an agreement is signed, and (2) how the surplus from an agreement is divided
between the governments. In particular, the static and dynamic conditions for a date-1
agreement coincide. To understand the result, let ∆(v1D, v
2
D) be the ex-ante expected date-
2 surplus from the perspective of the date-1 bargaining parties, when the date-1 domestic
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government DG1 has project valuation v
1
D and DG2 has valuation v
2
D:
∆(v1D, v
2
D) = 1[v
2
D = v
1
D]w +
σ∫
−(v2D+vF )
(v1D + λ+ vF )f(λ)dλ. (6)
Crucially, this surplus does not depend on the date-2 standing offer, s2. In particular, the
total date-2 surplus arising from an agreement is no different than the surplus in the event
of disagreement. Thus, the total surplus from a date-1 agreement versus no agreement is
unrelated to its terms:
(1− δ)(v1D + vF ) + δ Pr(v)∆(v1D, v) + δ Pr(v)∆(v1D, v)
−(1− δ)(0 + 0) − δ Pr(v)∆(v1D, v)− δ Pr(v)∆(v1D, v)
=(1− δ)(v1D + vF ). (7)
Since there is a constant surplus at each date, the surplus across dates is also constant,
and its division represents a pure conflict of interest between the date-1 negotiating parties.
Starting from an offer that gives DG1 its reservation payoff, suppose that FG can benefit
from making larger initial offers that buttress its future negotiating position vis-a`-vis an
anticipated date-two domestic government. This could arise if both date-1 governments ex-
pect a significantly more hostile DG2 and the election is sufficiently imminent that FG’s
immediate losses from a larger transfer today are outweighed by its expected future gains.
Whenever a more generous offer raises FG’s total expected payoff, however, the constant
total expected surplus implies that this gain necessarily comes at the expense of DG1, which
therefore prefers to reject the offer.
Thus, when agreement is reached, FG extracts all surplus from agreement. Equation (7)
reveals that the total surplus is positive if and only if the total static surplus is positive: un-
certainty about the future has no effect on whether an agreement is signed. Note, however,
that the transfer from FG to DG1 does not solve the static participation constraint that
v1D + b1 ≥ 0, but rather the dynamic participation constraint given by expression (5).
For simplicity, we assume that the foreign government FG makes the offer at date 1. If,
instead, the domestic government, DG1, makes the initial offer, the conditions for agreement
in Proposition 1 still apply, but now the domestic government extracts all surplus.
Exogenous power transitions create a constant total surplus between the foreign govern-
ment and the date-one domestic government. So long as the static surplus from an agreement
is positive, the foreign government can and will wish to induce the domestic government’s
participation. But, there is no scope for both governments to benefit from more generous
offers—so if and only if the date-one surplus is positive, (1) an agreement is signed and (2)
the discounted total expected surplus is fully extracted by the foreign government.
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We next establish that when power transitions are, instead, endogenous, the terms of
any initial agreement represent a polarizing force on domestic politics, and that more gener-
ous date-one agreements may increase or decrease the surplus from agreement between the
date-1 negotiators. In contrast with our benchmark setting, we will show how the prospect
of imminent elections may facilitate date-1 agreements even when the static surplus from
agreement between governments is negative, or instead impede date-1 agreements even when
the static surplus between governments is positive.
Endogenous Power Transitions. We now consider an electoral contest between dates
1 and 2 in which domestic voters, who differ in their project valuations v ∈ R, observe
the date-1 negotiation outcome and then simultaneously cast their ballots in favor of their
most-preferred date-2 government.
Imminent elections have a polarizing effect on negotiations between the FG and the date-
1 domestic government, DG1. In the benchmark setting, initial negotiations are driven by
the conflict of interest between the date-1 negotiating partners over the division of the sur-
plus. When elections are responsive to initial agreements, two other conflicts are critical:
the policy and rent-seeking conflict between the domestic incumbent and its possible succes-
sors, and both domestic and foreign governments’ conflict with the domestic electorate. As
a consequence, initial agreements no longer solely serve to divide the surplus: depending on
whether DG1 is relatively friendly or hostile, initial agreements may themselves change both
the division and the size of the surplus from agreement.
Given status quo agreement s2, a domestic voter with valuation v prefers a date-2 do-
mestic government that, from her perspective, induces the most favorable date-2 negotiation
outcome, i.e., that solves:
max
v2D
VD(v, v
2
D, s2),
where we recall that s2 = b1 if the project was implemented at date 1 with transfer b1, or
s2 = s1 if the project was not implemented at date 1. With a uniform distribution over the
preference shock, λ, we obtain:
Lemma 1. Given an inherited status quo agreement s2, a domestic voter with project val-
uation v prefers to elect the hostile government if and only if:
v ≤ v + v
2
+ (vF − s2) ≡ vˆ(s2). (8)
A domestic voter’s induced preference for the friendly or hostile party depends on (1)
her expectation that either party will reach an agreement with the foreign government in
the same circumstances where she would value the project, and (2) her desire to extract a
relatively more generous transfer from the foreign government in exchange for implementing
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the project. The first aspect depends on the voter’s valuation, but the second applies to
all voters regardless of ideology, since all voters share a common value in extracting greater
surplus from the foreign government.
Electing a relatively more hostile domestic government has two competing effects on these
considerations. First, a more hostile DG2 is at greater risk of failing to reach agreement with
FG in circumstances where the voter wants the project to proceed. Second, a more hostile
DG2 can more credibly threaten to quit an existing agreement. This raises the prospect that
it successfully renegotiates a larger transfer from FG.
A domestic voter is more intrinsically aligned with the friendly party whenever v > v+v
2
:
the friendly party is relatively more likely to reach agreements with the foreign government
in circumstances where the voter would prefer an agreement to no agreement. Yet, Lemma 1
reveals that this domestic voter may nonetheless strictly prefer to vote for the hostile party!
The reason is that a voter’s trade-off between the relatively friendly and hostile parties also
depends on the inherited agreement s2.
If FG’s standing offer s2 is not too small relative to its total willingness to pay vF , the voter
is inclined to appoint the more friendly government. With little additional surplus to extract
from FG, a voter prefers a representative who is more likely to preserve the initial agreement.
If, instead, FG would be prepared to offer much higher concessions to preserve the project,
i.e., if vF−s2 is large, then voters are inclined to appoint the more hostile government: a voter
is more willing to risk her representative failing to reach agreement in order to secure more
generous negotiation outcomes. Thus, fundamentally pro-EU voters may elect an anti-EU
party for instrumental reasons. So, too, regional elections may produce strong majorities for
a secessionist party even though a majority of voters would prefer not to secede. Notice that
it is precisely when FG has the most at stake from securing agreement, i.e., when its project
valuation vF is large, that the voter’s incentives to elect a more hostile DG2 are strongest.
Figure 1 illustrates a voter’s induced preferences over date-2 governments via a numerical
example. Given standing offer s2 = 3 and FG valuation vF = 6, a voter with valuation v = 1
who faced no friction in the supply of date-2 governments would prefer the DG2 with valua-
tion v−(vF −s2) = −2. Since she must either choose the relatively friendly or relatively hos-
tile party, she prefers whichever party has the valuation that is closest to −2, and is therefore
indifferent between the friendly party, with valuation v = −1, and the hostile party, with val-
uation v = −3. This is in spite of her intrinsically favorable attitude to the project (since her
static valuation is positive), and thus her intrinsic alignment with the relatively friendly party.
Voters’ induced preferences over date-2 representatives are manipulable by both date-1
governments. FG can manipulate the voter’s trade-offs via its initial offer, b1 ≥ s1: more
generous offers—if accepted—will steer voters toward more project-friendly representatives.
But DG1 can also manipulate the voters’ trade-offs via its choice to accept or reject the
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Figure 1: Induced preferences of a voter with date-1 valuation v = 1 over date-2 domestic governments,
for v = −1, v = −3, vF = 6, and s2 = 3. The domestic voter’s expected payoff is maximized by a DG2
with valuation v− (vF − s2) = −2. Any domestic voter with valuation v′ < 1 strictly prefers to support the
relatively hostile party, even if v′ > v > v.
offer, r1(b1) ∈ {0, 1}: rejecting an offer bequeathes a worse status quo, inducing voters to
prefer a more hostile successor. How these concerns affect the prospect of initial agreements,
and the division of the surplus, will depend on the policy conflict between domestic parties,
between the parties and their electorate, and between all domestic agents and the foreign
government. We now proceed to show how these conflicts resolve.
Henceforth, we assume that the distribution of voters’ project valuations has a unique
median. The single-peaked structure of induced preferences then implies that the voter with
this median valuation is decisive in an election: for any standing offer s2, the hostile party
wins the election if and only if vmed ≤ v+v
2
+ (vF − s2) ≡ vˆ(s2). We allow for the possibility
that both the foreign government and domestic parties are uncertain of the median voter’s
project valuation in between dates 1 and 2:
Assumption 4: The valuation vmed of the median voter is drawn from a uniform distribution
on the interval [ve − α, ve + α], where (1) ve − α < v+v
2
, and (2) ve + α > v+v
2
+ vF − s1.
Uniform uncertainty is not essential for any of our results, but it facilitates tractable
comparative statics (e.g., on ve and α). Interpretations are natural. For example, the larger
is α, the more uncertain are date-1 negotiating parties about the preferences of the domestic
electorate. Conditions (1) and (2) imply that there is enough uncertainty about voter pref-
erences that each party wins with positive probability given any standing offer, s2 ∈ [s1, vF ].
We earlier showed that when power transitions are exogenous, total expected surplus is
unaffected by the initial agreement. This is no longer true when date-1 outcomes can alter
electoral outcomes. To see why, recognize that from the perspective of the date-1 bargaining
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parties, the expected date-2 surplus derived from a status quo s2 is:
Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s2))∆(v1D, v) + Pr(vmed > vˆ(s2))∆(v1D, v), (9)
where ∆(v, v2D) (defined in equation (6)) is the ex-ante expected date-2 surplus from the per-
spective of the date-1 bargaining parties when DG1 has project valuation v
1
D and DG2 has
valuation v2D. Thus the relative total surplus from an agreement (versus no agreement) is:
(1− δ)(vF + v1D) + δ(Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1))− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1)))(∆(v1D, v)−∆(v1D, v)). (10)
Lemma 2 highlights how the relative total surplus from an agreement changes with the terms
of the agreement, depending on whether DG1 is relatively friendly or relatively hostile.
Lemma 2. For any δ > 0, the relative total surplus from an agreement with transfer b1
between the foreign government and the date-1 domestic government is:
1. strictly increasing in b1 if DG1 is relatively friendly, with valuation v,
2. strictly decreasing in b1 if DG1 is relatively hostile, with valuation v.
To understand why, notice that the change in relative surplus between the date-1 negotiators
from increasing the transfer from b1 to a higher offer b
′
1 is:
δ(Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b′1))− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1)))(∆(v1D, v)−∆(v1D, v)).
If DG1 is friendly, i.e., if v
1
D = v, then the second bracketed term is strictly negative; if in-
stead DG2 is hostile, i.e., if v
1
D = v, then the second term is strictly positive. However, higher
transfers also encourage domestic voters to support the friendly party in the polls, so that:
b′1 > b1 ⇒ vˆ(b′1) < vˆ(b1)⇒ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b′1)) < Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1)).
Lemma 2 is fundamental to our subsequent results, and highlights the polarizing effect
of domestic elections on conflicts and confluences of interest between the date-1 negotiating
parties. In the benchmark setting with exogenous elections, different offers change the di-
vision of the surplus, but not its size. When national elections are sensitive to negotiation
outcomes, however, offers affect both the surplus size and its division.
We now characterize date-1 negotiation outcomes. DG1 accepts an offer, i.e., r1(b1) = 1,
if and only if:
(1− δ)(v1D + b1) + δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1))(1[v1D = v]w + VD(v1D, v, b1))
+ δ Pr(vmed > vˆ(b1))(1[v
1
D = v]w + VD(v
1
D, v, b1))
≥ (1− δ)0 + δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1))(1[v1D = v]w + VD(v1D, v, s1))
+ δ Pr(vmed > vˆ(s1))(1[v
1
D = v]w + VD(v
1
D, v, s1)). (11)
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Thus, FG’s date-1 proposal solves:
max
b1≥s1
(1− δ)r1(b1)(vF − b1) + δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s2(r1(b1), b1)))VF (v, s2(r1(b1), b1))
+δ Pr(vmed > vˆ(s2(r1(b1), b1)))VF (v, s2(r1(b1), b1)), (12)
subject to the participation constraint that r1(b1) = 1 if (11) holds, and r1(b1) = 0, otherwise,
and the date-2 status quo offer is s2(r1(b1), b1) = r1(b1)b1+(1−r1(b1))s1. We first characterize
the outcomes of date-1 negotiations between the foreign government and the hostile party,
which has project valuation v.
Proposition 2. (Hostile Party Initially Holds Power).
1. If v+ vF ≤ 0, i.e., the static surplus between hostile DG1 and FG is negative, a date-1
agreement is never signed.
2. If v+vF > 0, i.e., the static surplus between hostile DG1 and FG is positive, there exists
δ∗(v, w) > 0 such that if and only if an election is not too close, i.e., δ ≤ δ∗, a date-1
agreement is signed. The threshold δ∗(v, w) decreases in w, and for any v ∈ (−vF , v),
limw→∞ δ∗(v, w) = 0.
3. Whenever there is a date-1 agreement, the foreign government retains all of the surplus
from agreement.
Just as in the benchmark setting, a positive static surplus is necessary for the governments
to reach an agreement. However, now a responsive electorate may render a positive static
surplus insufficient to guarantee an initial agreement. Not only there is a static conflict—a
greater date-1 transfer to the domestic government means less for the foreign government—
but more generous offers reduce the governments’ anticipated future surplus. The reason is
that more generous offers lower the prospect that the hostile party retains power, denying
it both the chance to capture office rents w and the ability to steer future negotiations.
In a static context, or in a dynamic setting where elections do not respond to negoti-
ations, an agreement would be signed whenever there is a positive date-1 surplus. In the
present context, however, sufficiently imminent elections preclude a date-1 agreement, for
any positive date-1 surplus, if office-holding motives are sufficiently strong. Finally, because
one government’s gain must constitute a loss to the other, the foreign government fully ap-
propriates the surplus whenever an agreement is reached, just as in the benchmark setting,
Proposition 2 thus highlights that more proximate elections can make impossible an
agreement between FG and the hostile DG1 that otherwise could have been secured, i.e.,
even when the static surplus from agreement is positive.
Matters are very different when DG1 is the friendly party with project valuation v:
18
Proposition 3. (Friendly Party Initially Holds Power).
1. If v+ vF ≥ 0, i.e., the static surplus between friendly DG1 and FG is positive, a date-1
agreement is always signed.
2. If v + vF < 0, i.e., the static surplus between friendly DG1 and FG is negative, there
exists δ∗∗(v, w) > 0 such that if and only if an election is sufficiently close, i.e., δ ≥ δ∗∗,
a date-1 agreement is signed. The threshold δ∗∗(v, w) decreases in w, and for any
v ∈ (v,−vF ), limw→∞ δ∗∗(v, w) = 0.
3. If FG’s valuation vF is not too small, there exists δˆ > δ
∗∗ such that if the election is
sufficiently close, i.e., if δ > δˆ, and office rents are sufficiently large, then FG offers
DG1 a strictly positive share of the surplus from the agreement.
As in the setting with exogenous turnover, a positive static surplus is sufficient for the
governments to reach an agreement. But with endogenous turnover, a positive static surplus
is not necessary: more generous offers bolster the re-election prospects of the friendly DG1,
raising its chances of gaining office rents w as well as the ability to steer subsequent nego-
tiations in its favor. As elections draw nearer, the static conflict between FG and friendly
DG1 pales in significance to the joint interest of both governments in using date-1 outcomes
to steer voters’ induced preferences in favor of re-electing the incumbent.
Suppose, for example, that the static surplus between FG and the friendly DG1 is neg-
ative: vF + v < 0. In a static context, or in a dynamic setting where elections do not
respond to negotiations, Proposition 1 shows that agreements between the governments are
impossible. When elections are responsive to negotiating outcomes, by contrast, the surplus
from agreement itself changes with more generous offers: the date-1 negotiating parties’
joint concern to keep the hostile party out by shaping voters’ induced preferences creates a
confluence of interest that may facilitate agreement despite the negative static surplus. If
office-holding motives are strong enough, sufficiently imminent elections facilitate a date-1
agreement for any date-1 surplus—positive or negative.
Proposition 3 therefore highlights that more proximate elections make possible an agree-
ment between FG and the friendly DG1 that otherwise could not have been secured, i.e.,
even when the static surplus from agreement is negative.
With exogenous turnover, or when DG1 is relatively hostile, FG appropriates all of the
surplus from an agreement. By contrast, Proposition 3 shows that when DG1 is relatively
friendly, an imminent election may induce FG to offer a strictly positive share of the surplus.
The reason is that when negotiations are conducted close to the election, FG’s interest in
promoting the friendly DG1’s reelection leads it to make more generous offers in order to
sway domestic voters in favor of the incumbent.
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This raises a basic question: conditional on securing a date-1 agreement, which date-
1 party—the hostile party or the friendly one—extracts greater transfers from the foreign
government? On the one hand, a friendly DG1 enjoys a strictly positive surplus from the
agreement, while a hostile DG1 is held to its participation constraint. On the other hand, the
friendly DG1’s participation can be more easily secured than the hostile DG1’s participation.
Our next result provides an unambiguous resolution to this question:
Corollary 1. A hostile domestic government is less likely to successfully negotiate a date-1
agreement. Nonetheless, whenever it implements the project, it negotiates a higher transfer
than what a friendly domestic government would obtain.
The result reflects that the friendly party derives a higher surplus from agreements than the
hostile party simply because its participation can be bought more cheaply by the foreign gov-
ernment. The hostile DG1’s participation constraint is more stringent than the analogous
constraint for a friendly DG1, so whenever FG derives no surplus from an agreement, the re-
sult is immediate. Suppose, instead, that the friendly DG1’s participation constraint is slack
when FG advances its most preferred offer. This offer, b∗1, solves the first-order condition
associated with (12). Recall that FG and the hostile DG1 face a pure conflict of interest:
any gain for one must come at the expense of the other. If b∗1 is most preferred by FG, its
value is strictly increasing in an offer b1 ∈ [s1, b∗1]—and so, the hostile party’s value relative
to rejection is strictly decreasing. It follows that to induce the hostile DG1’s participation,
FG must over-extend itself relative to its most preferred offer, i.e., its offer must exceed b∗1.
Thus, even at date 1, voters face a trade-off with a more hostile domestic government. If
DG1 is too hostile, negotiations will break down. If, instead, it is very friendly to the project,
it may agree to relatively ungenerous terms. Because the friendly DG1 always reaches agree-
ment with FG, its conflict with voters always rises with its value from holding office w, be-
cause it becomes willing to accept ever-worse offers in order to improve its electoral prospects
relative to securing no transfers. With the hostile DG1, the consequences of a greater office
concerns are less clear-cut. On the one hand, conditional on securing agreement, greater office
motivation makes the hostile party demand more transfers to compensate for its diminished
electoral prospects resulting from an agreement. This gives the hostile party commitment
power to reject offers that the friendly party would accept. On the other hand, a near-
exclusive concern for retaining office may preclude agreement between a hostile DG1 and FG.
Consequences of Changes in Domestic Politics. We now ask how changes in the prefer-
ences of the two domestic parties affect FG’s preferred initial offer, i.e., the interior offer that
solves FG’s objective (12). FG’s responses turn on the answers to two questions: how does
the change affect FG’s relative value from steering the subsequent election toward the friendly
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party? And, how does the change affect FG’s ability to influence the electoral outcome? Re-
call that, under Assumption 4, we assume that vmed is uniformly distributed on [ve−α, ve+α].
Suppose that one of the domestic political parties grows more inclined toward the project,
i.e., either v or v rises. If that party later wins office, FG calculates that the party’s threat
to walk away from the agreement is now less credible, since it values the agreement by more.
This encourages FG to respond with lower transfers.
However, the party preference shift also alters the electoral competitiveness of the two
parties. Recall that a voter who is indifferent between the parties has project valuation
vˆ(s2) =
v + v
2
+ (vF − s2).
Absent any change in the negotiation settlement, a higher v lowers the electoral competi-
tiveness of the friendly party by shifting vˆ to the right, raising the prospect that the median
domestic voter will favor the hostile party. Conversely, a higher v raises the electoral compet-
itiveness of the hostile party. Absent any change in FG’s offer, these shifts place the friendly
party at an increased disadvantage. This encourages FG to respond with larger transfers.
Finally, FG’s value from promoting the friendly party’s reelection depends on the wedge
v − v between the two party’s bargaining attitudes. When the friendly party grows even
more favorably disposed to the project, the wedge grows, raising FG’s stake from steering the
election toward it, encouraging FG to raise its transfer. By contrast, when the hostile party
moderates, the wedge shrinks, reducing FG’s stake, encouraging FG to lower its transfer.
These calculations relate to the value placed by FG on using higher offers to buttress its
future negotiating position. But whether higher offers can have a meaningful impact on the
election depends on the sensitivity of the pivotal voter’s choices to offers. With uniformly
distributed uncertainty, the density of vmed evaluated at the threshold vˆ(s2) is
1
2α
: electoral
outcomes are more sensitive to offers when α is lower.
When α is large, election outcomes are insensitive to offers, so FG’s return from using
higher transfers to steer the election toward the friendly party is low. In this case, FG’s re-
sponse to an improvement in the attitude of either party reflects that, conditional on holding
office, that party is less likely to successfully renegotiate the terms. This encourages FG to
reduce its offer. When α is small enough, election outcomes become sensitive to offers, and
the FG can more effectively steer the domestic electorate in favor of the friendly party by way
of a more generous offer. We now show how, depending on FG’s value from promoting the
election of the friendly party, this may lead to either more or less generous date-1 agreements.
Proposition 4. (Friendly Party’s Valuation Increases). Suppose the project valuation v of
the friendly domestic political party increases. Then there exist at most two thresholds α∗
and α∗ such that if α < α∗, FG’s preferred offer increases and if α > α∗, FG’s preferred
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(c) α = 6
Figure 2: Illustration of how FG’s most preferred proposal varies with the project valuation of the friendly
party. Parameters: δ = 1, vF = 3, θ = .5, σ = 3, v = −3, ve = −1, s1 = 0 and v ∈ [− 34 , 0]. Panel (a)
corresponds to high electoral return from more generous offers, (b) to intermediate electoral return, and
(c) to low electoral return. The thresholds described in Proposition 5 are (two decimal places): α∗ = 4.62,
α∗ = 5.54, and v∗(α) = .5(−3α+√3√α(7α− 8)− 6).
offer decreases. For α ∈ [α∗, α∗], there exists v∗(α) such that FG’s most preferred offer is
decreasing in v if and only if v ≤ v∗(α).
Figure 2 illustrates these findings. If α is small, election outcomes are very sensitive to ne-
gotiation outcomes, so FG responds to increases in v with increased offers, to promote the
reelection of the friendly DG1. But, if α is large, election outcomes are relatively insensitive
to higher offers, so FG responds with lower offers, since improvements in the friendly party’s
bargaining attitude make it a more pliant negotiating partner when it is retained.
Finally, when α is intermediate, the election is only moderately sensitive to international
negotiations. When v and v are very close, the two parties are almost indistinguishable from
FG’s perspective. As a result, increases in v only modestly increase FG’s value of promoting
the reelection of the friendly party. In conjunction with the reduced electoral returns from
raising its offer (since α > α¯∗), FG prefers to respond to a higher v with smaller transfers.
As the friendly party grows even more favorably disposed to the project, i.e., v rises,
FG’s trade-offs change. The increasing wedge v − v in valuations between the domestic po-
litical parties raises FG’s stake in promoting the electoral success of the friendly party. In
conjunction with the non-trivial electoral returns from raising its offer (since α < α¯∗), FG
responds to a higher v with larger transfers.
Related, but distinct, considerations drive FG’s response when the hostile party’s valua-
tion v rises:
Proposition 5. (Hostile Party’s Valuation Increases) Suppose the hostile party is initially
electorally competitive, in the sense that
ve − v < vF − s1, (13)
Then, if the hostile party’s project valuation v increases, FG’s most preferred offer decreases.
Otherwise, there exist at most two thresholds α∗ and α
∗ such that if α < α∗, FG’s preferred
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offer increases and if α > α∗, FG’s preferred offer decreases. For α ∈ [α∗, α∗], there exists
v∗(α) such that FG’s preferred offer is increasing in v if and only if v ≤ v∗(α).
An increase in the hostile party’s project valuation v has three effects. First, conditional
on winning office, the hostile party is a more pliant negotiator. Second, FG’s stakes in the
election decrease, since the expected difference in the bargaining stances of the two parties
falls when the hostile party’s valuation v rises. Third, the hostile party wins more votes,
since its platform moves closer to the friendly party’s platform, i.e., v+v
2
moves to the right.
The first two effects encourage FG to reduce its offer, while the third encourages it to raise
its offer to offset the hostile party’s increased electoral advantage.
The difference ve− v represents the intrinsic expected mis-alignment between the hostile
party and the electorate. When this mis-alignment is large, voters worry about the risk that a
hostile DG2 will fail to reach agreement, causing the project to be abandoned. However, when
condition (13) holds, this risk is outweighed by the additional surplus that could be extracted
from renegotiating a standing offer s1 up to vF , and which a hostile government is more likely
to secure. We say that the hostile party is ‘competitive’ when condition (13) holds.
Condition (13) holds in Figure 2. When the hostile party is competitive, its behavior
conditional on winning office dominates FG’s calculation. As v rises, FG understands that,
if elected, the hostile party will be less credible in its threats to unilaterally quit at the
inherited terms. Thus, it responds with lower transfers.
When the hostile party is initially uncompetitive, changes in fundamentals that improve
its electoral prospects weigh more heavily on FG. If α is small, the election outcome is sensitive
to date-1 transfers, so FG responds to a higher v with more generous offers to offset the hostile
party’s increased electoral advantage. If, instead, α is large, FG lowers its transfer, because
it understands that efforts to influence the election through its offer would be ineffectual.
Finally, when α is intermediate, the election outcome is only moderately sensitive to
offers. Again, when v rises, the hostile party becomes more electorally competitive. But if v
is very close to v, FG regards the two parties as almost indistinguishable. This lowers FG’s
stake from using higher transfers to compensate the friendly party’s reduced competitiveness.
In conjunction with the reduced returns from raising its offer (since α > α∗), FG prefers to
respond to a higher v with smaller transfers. If, instead, the hostile party’s valuation v is
initially far less than v, FG anticipates a large wedge between the bargaining postures of the
two parties, raising its stake in partially offsetting the friendly party’s increased disadvantage
due to an increase in v. In conjunction with the non-trivial electoral returns from raising its
offer (since α < α∗), FG prefers to respond to a higher v with larger transfers.
In the Appendix, we show how the prospect of a long-term (i.e., date-2) agreement may
actually fall if the hostile party becomes more favorably disposed to the project, i.e., if its val-
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uation v rises. Conditional on the hostile party winning office, a deal is now more likely. But,
the more moderate hostile party is more electorally competitive, making it more likely to win
power—it now captures some voters who initially would have favored the friendly party, and
the foreign government may respond with even less generous offers, further pushing domestic
voters to support the hostile party. These two forces can dominate, causing prospects for
long-term agreements to deteriorate when a hostile party that is initially electorally marginal
grows more competitive by moderating its stance in favor of the project.
5. Extensions and Robustness
In the Appendix, we pursue several extensions, a subset of which we briefly outline.
More Domestic Alternatives. Our benchmark analysis considers a two-party system. In
the Appendix, we allow the median voter to select a date-2 domestic government that has
any valuation v2D ∈ [v, v]. This may reflect a setting with purely office-motivated parties that
can commit to any policy.12 Given a standing offer, s2, a voter with valuation v most prefers
a DG2 with valuation v− (vF −s2). This is also true in our benchmark setting (recall Figure
1); but in that context the voter must choose from one of two possible alternatives. In the
extension, by contrast, the median voter can always achieve her most preferred alternative.
Our result for exogenous election outcomes (Proposition 1) that static and dynamic
conditions for a date-1 agreement coincide extends directly to this setting. In the two-party
setting with endogenous elections, however, Lemma 2 shows that, depending on the valuation
of DG1, the total surplus from agreement is either strictly increasing, or strictly decreasing,
in the standing offer s2. With more than two alternatives, the relationship between standing
offers and surplus is more subtle. When the median voter’s valuation is distributed uniformly
on [ve − α, ve + α] and ve − α − (vF − s1) > v and ve + α < v, the project valuation of the
median’s preferred date-2 representative is contained in (v, v). We have:
Lemma 3. Suppose that the median voter selects DG2 from the interval [v, v]. Then, the
expected total surplus from an agreement between FG and DG1 with valuation v
1
D is a
single-peaked function of the offer b1, with unique maximizer b
∗ = v1D + vF − ve.
To understand the result, recall that DG2’s valuation in the event of an agreement is vˆ
2
D(b1) =
12In this interpretation, with two purely office-motivated parties that can commit to any policy, the
assumption that the median voter selects DG2 is without loss of generality, since voters’ induced preferences
over alternative DG2 valuations are single-peaked.
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vmed−(vF−b1), so that the total expected date-2 surplus between the date-1 governments is:
ve+α∫
ve−α
σ∫
−(vF+vˆ2D(b1))
1
2α
[
1[vˆ2D = v
1
D]w + (v
1
D + vF + λ)f(λ) dλ
]
dvmed. (14)
This surplus is maximized—both via policy rents and policy payoffs—when E[vˆ2D(b1)] = v1D,
i.e., when b1 = v
1
D + vF − ve. Thus, any DG1 with valuation in (v, v) has both a partial
conflict of interest with FG, and a partial confluence of interest. To the extent that more
generous offers push the expected valuation of DG2 up and toward the initial valuation of
DG1, the governments are aligned. But as more generous offers push the expected valuation
of DG2 above the initial valuation of DG1, the conflict between governments intensifies.
In our base two-party setting, the absolute degree of alignment between DG1 and FG,
i.e., the values of v1D and vF , do not affect the sign of the impact of more generous offers
on the surplus: what matters is the relative alignment, i.e., which of the two parties is most
closely aligned. In contrast, with many possible succeeding parties, the expression for b∗
in Lemma 3 reveals that absolute degrees of conflict between the governments and voters
are crucial in determining the extent to which DG1 and FG are sufficiently aligned in their
dynamic interests to achieve date-1 agreements.
In the Supplemental Appendix, we show how the electorate may benefit from being con-
strained to choose from a limited set of parties that cannot freely adapt platforms to perfectly
reflect the preferred date-2 bargaining stances of voters. These frictions give the electorate
a partial commitment to elect a more hostile government than it would otherwise select,
thereby disciplining FG’s date-1 offer. Gains from a limited choice tend to be highest when,
relative to the date-1 domestic government, the median voter is more hostile to the project—
these are the circumstances in which her implicit threat to revert to a far more hostile date-2
representative is most credible and thus strongly improves date-1 negotiation outcomes.
Limited Policy Commitments. Our core analysis presumes that parties cannot commit
to platforms prior to entering office: voters anticipate that parties will choose the bargaining
stance that maximizes their expected payoffs once they enter office. In the Appendix, we con-
sider a related setting in which, between dates 1 and 2 but before learning the shock to voter
preferences, the friendly and hostile parties may each commit to a bargaining posture—i.e.,
a party may commit to negotiating at date 2 as if it had some intrinsic value v.13 Consistent
with Calvert (1985), platform differentiation arises in equilibrium: the hostile party commits
to a more hostile bargaining stance than the friendly party. There is, however, a degree of
moderation by the parties, because they trade-off the prospect of winning—which calls on
13We thank Gilat Levy, who proposed this extension.
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them to adopt a posture that is closest to the expected median’s most preferred posture—
with their intrinsic policy motivation. Thus, the hostile party’s promised platform lies to the
right of its most preferred bargaining posture (prior to learning λ), and the friendly party’s
platform lies to the left of its most preferred bargaining posture.
Retrospective Voting. Our base analysis presumes that voters are forward-looking, i.e.,
voting for the party that will secure the best anticipated negotiation outcomes. In the Sup-
plemental Appendix, we consider retrospective voters who reward or punish the incumbent
according to a linearly increasing function of their date-1 payoffs. Specifically, we assume:
Pr(reelect incumbent| date-1 outcome) = max{0,min{a+ βr1(vmed + b1), 1}}.
Here a reflects electoral aspects that do not depend on international negotiations, and β cap-
tures the salience of the negotiations in the election—when β is large, the date-1 domestic
government’s electorate fortunes are more sensitive to negotiation outcomes.
In our two-party benchmark setting, we show that if (1) international negotiations are
sufficiently salient and (2) domestic parties are sufficiently polarized, in the sense that
β(v − v) > 1 + θ
2
,
then an analogue of Proposition 2 holds: if DG1 is hostile, i.e., with value v, then either no
agreement is signed or FG holds hostile DG1 to its participation constraint. When v − v
is large, FG’s value from steering voters toward the friendly party is large, and when β
is large, the election outcome is especially sensitive to the date-1 outcome. These are the
circumstances in which the conflict of interest between FG and hostile DG1 is greatest.
With prospective voters, a hostile DG1 refuses more generous offers because they harm
its electoral prospects. With retrospective voters, the FG refuses to make more generous
offers to the hostile party because they advance its electoral prospects. Thus, the conflict
of interest between the date-1 negotiating parties is fundamental, and does not hinge on the
sophistication or foresight of the electorate. In contrast with prospective voters, however,
circumstances exist with retrospective voters in which a friendly DG1 secures a larger date-1
transfer than a hostile DG1.
6. Conclusion
Our paper analyzes the dynamics of international agreements and domestic politics. We
asked: how do the prospects for initial cooperation and the terms of agreements vary with
uncertainty about whether one of the negotiating parties will subsequently be replaced by
an agent with different preferences? And, how do the terms of an initial agreement affect
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the prospect of electoral replacement, the bargaining attitude of a potential successor, or the
risk that a successor will ultimately walk away from the agreement?
If elections outcomes are insensitive to bargaining outcomes, the answer is simple: uncer-
tainty about the future distribution of power plays no role in the prospects for initial agree-
ment or the division of the surplus. A static surplus between the governments is necessary and
sufficient for agreement, and the dynamic surplus is appropriated by the foreign government.
By contrast, when voters’ electoral decisions are sensitive to bargaining outcomes, nego-
tiations are driven by a three-way conflict of interest between the foreign government, the
domestic government, and the domestic electorate. Regardless of the static surplus from
agreement between the domestic and foreign government, the dynamic surplus is driven by
the governments’ joint alignment relative to the domestic electorate. When the governments
are closely aligned, the dynamic surplus from an agreement increases, facilitating success-
ful negotiations even when the static surplus is negative. By contrast, if the governments
are insufficiently aligned relative to the pivotal voter, the dynamic surplus from agreement
decreases, sharpening the dynamic conflict of interest between the governments. This may
rule out successful negotiations even when the static surplus is positive.
We view the most pressing next step in the research agenda to be the incorporation of two-
sided elections into the analysis. For example, the foreign government must eventually face
elections. This prospect may have sharpened the bargaining stances of EU member states
vis-a`-vis Greece over the course of 2015, as their own electorates grew increasingly frustrated.
It is also interesting to consider the possibility that in some political contexts, δ may be
partially endogenous—e.g., if the domestic government can choose election timing as in a
parliamentary democracy, or if negotiating parties strategically initiate negotiations close to,
or far from, an upcoming election. Paradoxically, a hostile party seems to have an incentive
to speed up initial negotiations so that the future weighs less on outcomes, while a friendly
party may want to hold back, so that the weight on the future grows in importance, imposing
testable restrictions on the data.
Although our motivating setting is the political economy of international negotiations,
our insights extend to other settings in which one of the negotiating parties is accountable to a
third party during negotiations. For example, consider an employer or government bargaining
with a Trade Union. To avoid a strike, an employer can offer wage increases or more flexible
working hours. Each party’s relative value of agreement is the value derived from not engag-
ing in industrial action, which disrupts production for the employer and earnings for workers.
When the Trade Union leadership is accountable to its members during the course of negotia-
tions via internal elections, our framework provides insights into the consequences of internal
democracy for the prospects of successful short- and long-run negotiations, and the division
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of surplus between the negotiating parties.14 In our setting, the accountability mechanism is
relatively coarse, i.e., an electoral decision to retain or replace the agent; in other contexts,
a principal may be able to commit to replacement strategies before initial negotiations con-
clude, or to offer richer reward schemes. We leave analyses of such settings to future research.
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8. Appendix: Proofs of Results
Proof of Proposition 1. We first verify necessary and sufficient conditions for the project
to be implemented at date 1. It is easy to verify that DG1’s relative date-1 value of agreement
with transfer b1 is a convex function of b1, and that there exists a unique bD(v
1
D) ≥ s1 such
r1(b1) = 1 is weakly preferred by DG1 with date-1 valuation v
1
D if and only if b1 ≥ bD(v1D).
Assumption 1 that v < v and Assumption 2 that v + s1 < 0 further imply bD(v
1
D) > s1. By
similar arguments, we obtain a unique transfer bF ∈ (s1, vF ) such that FG’s relative date-1
value of agreement is positive if and only if b1 ≤ bF . We conclude that there exists a transfer
b1 ≥ s1 such that both DG1 and FG receive a weakly higher value from a date-1 agreement
at b1 than from no date-1 agreement if and only if bD(v
1
D) ≤ bF , which is equivalent to
(1 − δ)(v1D + vF ) ≥ 0. This establishes our first claim. We next show that if v1D + vF ≥ 0,
FG’s offer b1 satisfies DG1’s participation constraint—given by (5)—with equality. Fix DG1’s
strategy r1(b1) = 1 if and only if b1 ≥ bD. Suppose, to the contrary, FG weakly prefers to
make an offer b1 > bD(v
1
D). This is equivalent to
(1− δ)(vF − b1) + δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)VF (v
2
D, b1)
≥ (1− δ)(vF + v1D) + δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)∆(v
1
D, v
2
D)− δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)VD(v
1
D, v
2
D, s1). (15)
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Using the identity
∑
v2D∈{v,v} Pr(v
2
D)VD(v
1
D, v
2
D, s1) =
∑
v2D∈{v,v} Pr(v
2
D)[∆(v
1
D, v
2
D)−VF (v2D, s1)],
we re-write (15) as:
(1−δ)(vF −b1)+δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)VF (v
2
D, b1) ≥ (1−δ)(vF +v1D)+δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)VF (v
2
D, s1),
or:
(1− δ)(v1D + b1) ≤ δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)[VF (v
2
D, b1)− VF (v2D, s1)]. (16)
Finally, b1 > bD(v
1
D) implies that DG1 strictly prefers r1(b1) = 1:
(1− δ)(v1D + b1) + δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)VD(v
1
D, v
2
D, b1) > δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)VD(v
1
D, v
2
D, s1), (17)
which is equivalent to:
(1− δ)(v1D + b1) > δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)[VF (v
2
D, b1)− VF (v2D, s1)], (18)
and which therefore contradicts expression (16). 
Proof of Lemma 1. A domestic voter with valuation v prefers the hostile party if and only
if VD(v
1
D, v, s2) ≥ VD(v1D, v, s2). Substituting λ ∼ U [−σ, σ] and using Assumption 2 reveals
that this condition is equivalent to v ≤ v+v
2
+ vF − s2. 
Proof of Lemma 2. The total relative surplus from an agreement with transfer b1 between
FG and the DG1 is:
(1− δ)(v1D + vF ) + δ[Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1))∆(v1D, v) + Pr(vmed > vˆ(b1))∆(v1D, v)]
− δ[Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1))∆(v1D, v) + Pr(vmed > vˆ(s1))∆(v1D, v)]. (19)
Thus, the change in total relative surplus from an agreement with transfer b′1 rather than
b1 < b
′
1 is:
δ(Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b′1))− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1)))(∆(v1D, v)−∆(v1D, v)). (20)
We have ∆(v, v) − ∆(v, v) > 0, and ∆(v, v) − ∆(v, v) < 0; moreover, b′1 > b1 implies
vˆ(b′1) < vˆ(b1) and thus Pr(v
med ≤ vˆ(b′1))− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1)) < 0. Thus, for all δ > 0, (20) is
strictly positive if v1D = v, and strictly negative if v
1
D = v 
Proof of Proposition 2. The difference between the total expected surplus from a date-1
agreement with transfer b1 between FG and the hostile DG1 with date-1 valuation v, and
the total expected surplus from no date-1 agreement, is:
(1− δ)(v + vF ) + δ(Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1))− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1)))(∆(v, v)−∆(v, v)). (21)
For any δ ∈ (0, 1), (21) strictly decreases in b1, and has a unique zero that we denote b∆(v, δ).
For hostile DG1 with valuation v, the relative value of an agreement with transfer b1, versus
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no agreement, is:
Ψ(b1, v, δ) = (1− δ)(v + b1) + δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1))VD(v, v, b1) + δ Pr(vmed > vˆ(b1))VD(v, v, b1)
− δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1))VD(v, v, s1)− δ Pr(vmed > vˆ(s1))VD(v, v, s1)
− δ Pr(vˆ(b1) ≤ vmed ≤ vˆ(s1))w, (22)
convex in b1 with a unique zero b
D
1 (v) > s1, such that (22) is weakly positive if and only if
b1 ≥ bD1 (v). But, if v+vF ≤ 0, b∆(v, δ) ≤ s1, and therefore (21) is strictly negative evaluated
at bD1 (v) > s1. We conclude that if v + vF ≤ 0, a date-1 agreement is never signed for any
δ ∈ (0, 1).
Suppose, next, v + vF > 0. Then, a necessary and sufficient condition for a date-1
agreement is that (22) is weakly positive, evaluated at b∆(v, δ), i.e., that Ψ(b∆(v, δ), v, δ) ≥
0. Straightforward algebra reveals that Ψ(b∆(v, δ), v, δ) is strictly convex in δ ∈ (0, 1) if
(vF + v)((v − v)(vF + v + vF + v) + 4σw + α(1 + θ)2(vF + v)) > 0, which is true be-
cause v + vF > 0 implies v + vF > 0, by v − v > 0. Moreover, Ψ(b∆(v, 1), v, 1) = 0, and
there exists an additional root δˆ(v, w) solving Ψ(b∆(v, δˆ(v, w)), v, δˆ(v, w)) = 0. It follows
that an agreement is signed if and only if δ ≤ δ∗(v, w) = min{δˆ(v, w), 1}. We claim that
δˆ(v, w) > 0 for any v > −vF . To see this, we observe that δˆ(v, w) is equated to zero for
three values of v: v1 = −vF , v2 = −vF + α(1 + θ) +
√
(vF + v)2 + (1 + θ)2α2 + 4wσ, and
v3 = −vF −α(1 + θ) +
√
(vF + v)2 + (1 + θ)2α2 + 4wσ. Since v2 ≥ v, v3 ≤ −vF , and δˆ(v, w)
strictly increases in v evaluated at v = −vF , we conclude δˆ(v, w) > 0 for all v ∈ (−vF , v). It
is straightforward to verify that δˆ(v, w) strictly decreases in w, and that limw→∞ δˆ(v, w) = 0.
To prove the final claim, suppose that a date-1 agreement is signed, and conjecture that
(by way of contradiction) FG weakly prefers to advance an offer b′1 > b
D
1 (v). This implies:
(1− δ) (vF − b′1) + δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b′1))VF (v, b′1) + δ(1− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b′1)))VF (v, b′1)
≥ (1− δ)(vF + v) + δ(Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(bD1 (v)))− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1)))(∆(v, v)−∆(v, v))
+ δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1))VF (v, s1) + δ(1− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1)))VF (v, s1). (23)
Moreover, b′1 > b
D
1 (v) implies:
(1− δ)(v + b′1) + δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b′1))[VD(v, v, b′1) + w] + δ(1− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b′1)))VD(v, v, b′1)
> δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1))[VD(v, v, s1) + w] + δ(1− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1)))VD(v, v, s1).
(24)
Substituting VD(v
1
D, v, b1)+1[v
1
D = v]w = ∆(v
1
D, v)−VF (v, b1), reveals that (24) is equivalent
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to:
δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b′1))VF (v, b′1) + δ(1− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b′1)))VF (v, b′1)
< δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1))VF (v, s1) + δ(1− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1)))VF (v, s1)
+ δ(Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b′1))− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1)))(∆(v, v)−∆(v, v)) + (1− δ)(v + b′1). (25)
Combining (25) and (23) yields Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(bD1 (v))) < Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b′1)), ie., b′1 < bD1 (v), a
contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The difference between the total expected surplus from a date-1
agreement with transfer b1 between FG and the friendly DG1 with date-1 valuation v, and
the total expected surplus from no date-1 agreement, is:
(1− δ)(v + vF ) + δ(Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1))− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1)))(∆(v, v)−∆(v, v)). (26)
For any δ ∈ (0, 1), (26) strictly increases in b1, and has a unique zero that we denote b∆(v, δ)
so that (26) is weakly positive if and only if b1 ≥ b∆(v, δ). For FG, the relative value of an
agreement with transfer b1, versus no agreement, is:
Λ(b1, v, δ) = (1− δ)(vF − b1) + δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1))VF (v, b1) + δ Pr(vmed > vˆ(b1))VF (v, b1)
− δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1))VF (v, s1)− δ Pr(vmed > vˆ(s1))VF (v, s1).
(27)
For any δ ∈ (0, 1), (27) is strictly concave in b1, strictly positive evaluated at b1 = s1 and
strictly negative evaluated at b1 = vF . We conclude that there exists a unique threshold
bF ∈ (s1, vF ) such that (27) is weakly positive only if b1 ≤ bF . However, if v + vF ≥ 0, then
b∆(v) ≤ s1, so that (26) is strictly positive evaluated at bF . We conclude that if v + vF ≥ 0,
a date-1 agreement is always signed for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
Suppose, next, v+ vF < 0. A necessary and sufficient condition for a date-1 agreement is
Λ(b∆(v, δ), v, δ) ≥ 0. Straightforward algebra reveals that Λ(b∆(v, δ), v, δ) is strictly concave
in δ ∈ (0, 1) if −(vF + v)((v − v)(vF + v + vF + v) − 4wσ + 2α(1 + θ)(vF + v)) < 0, which
is true because v + vF < 0 implies v + vF < 0 by v − v > 0. Moreover, Λ(b∆(v, 1), v, 1) = 0
and there exists an additional root δˇ(v, w), i.e., solving Λ(b∆(v, δˇ(v, w)), v, δˇ(v, w)) = 0.
It follows that an agreement is signed if and only if δ ≥ δ∗∗(v, w) = min{δˇ(v, w), 1}.
We claim that δˇ(v, w) > 0 for any v ∈ (v,−vF ). To see this, notice that δˇ(v, w) = 0
has three roots: v1 = −vF , v2 = −vF − α(1 + θ) −
√
(vF + v)2 + (1 + θ)2α2 + 4σw, and
v3 = −vF − α(1 + θ) +
√
(vF + v)2 + (1 + θ)2α2 + 4σw. It is easily verified that v3 ≥ −vF ,
that v2 ≤ v, and that δˇ(v, w) strictly decreases in v evaluated at v = −vF . We conclude that
δˆ(v, w) > 0 for all v ∈ (v,−vF ). It is straightforward to verify that δˇ(v, w) strictly decreases
in w, and that limw→∞ δˇ(v, w) = 0.
To prove the final claim, recall that Λ(b1, v, δ) is strictly concave in b1. Let b
∗(δ) denote
32
the transfer solving the first-order condition associated with (27): b∗(δ) is strictly concave in δ
and limδ→0+ b∗1(δ) = −∞. Computation yields v∗F such that b∗(1) > s1 if and only if vF > v∗F ,
and that b∗(δ) strictly increases in δ. Thus, vF > v∗F implies that there exists δˆ < 1 such that
b∗1(δ) > s1 if and only if δ ∈ (δˆ, 1). Recalling that bD1 (v, δ) denotes the reservation transfer of
DG1 with value v ∈ {v, v}, that Ψ(b1, v, δ), given by expression (22), is the relative value to
hostile DG1 from choosing r1(b1), we define the analogous relative value for friendly DG1:
Φ(b1, v, δ) = (1− δ)(v + b1) + δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1))VD(v, v, b1) + δ Pr(vmed > vˆ(b1))VD(v, v, b1)
− δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1))VD(v, v, s1)− δ Pr(vmed > vˆ(s1))VD(v, v, s1)
+ δ Pr(vˆ(b1) ≤ vmed ≤ vˆ(s1))w, (28)
We establish that if w is sufficiently large, b∗(δ) > s1 implies Φ(b∗(δ), v, δ) > 0. Φ(b∗(δ), v, δ)
is strictly concave in δ, that Φ(b∗(δ), v, δ) linearly and strictly increases in w if and only if
b∗(δ) > s1, and that there exists w∗(δˆ) ∈ R such that Φ(b∗(δˆ), v, δˆ) > 0 if and only if w > w∗.
Thus w > w∗ implies Φ(b∗(δ), v, δ) > 0 for all δ > δˆ. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Recalling that bD1 (v, δ) denotes the reservation transfer of DG1 with
value v ∈ {v, v}, that Ψ(b1, v, δ), given by expression (22), is the relative value to hostile DG1
from choosing r1(b1), and that (28) is the corresponding relatively value to friendly DG1 from
choosing r1(b1), we have that b
D
1 (v, δ) > b
D
1 (v, δ) if, for any b1 ≥ 0, Ψ(b1; v, w)−Φ(b1; v, w) < 0
which, using VD(v, v
′, b1) = ∆(v, v′)− VF (v′, b1), is equivalent to:
(1− δ)(v − v) + δ(Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1))− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1)))(∆(v, v)−∆(v, v))
− δ(Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1))− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1)))(∆(v, v)−∆(v, v)) < 0, (29)
which is true, since Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1)) − Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1)) < 0, ∆(v, v) − ∆(v, v) > 0, and
∆(v, v)−∆(v, v) < 0. It remains only to show that bD1 (v, δ) > b∗(δ), where b∗(δ) was defined
in the proof of Proposition 3 as the transfer solving the first-order condition associated with
(27). Note that b∗(δ) is offered only if δ > 0. Then, recognize that the hostile DG1’s relative
value from an agreement can be written
(1− δ)(v + vF ) + δ(Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1))− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1)))(∆(v, v)−∆(v, v))
− [(1− δ)(vF − b1) + δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1))VF (v, b1) + δ(1− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1)))VF (v, b1)
− δ Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1))VF (v, s1)− δ(1− Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(s1)))VF (v, s1)]. (30)
The first line is the total expected surplus from a date-1 agreement, and strictly decreases
in b1 for δ > 0. The second and third lines are FG’s relative surplus from an agreement with
transfer b1—strictly concave in b1; by supposition, b
∗(δ) solves the associated first-order con-
dition, and so the second and third lines are increasing in b1 ∈ [0, b∗(δ)]. Thus, (30) strictly
decreases for δ > 0, and since hostile DG1’s relatively value from an agreement is strictly
negative evaluated at transfer b1 = s1, by Assumption 2, we conclude b
∗(δ) < b1D(v, δ).
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Proof of Propositions 4 and 5: We re-write FG’s interior offer b∗(δ) = b∗(α, v, v). By
direct substitution, we write ∂b
∗(α,v,v)
∂v
in the form ∂b
∗(α,v,v)
∂v
= ν(α,v,v)
κ
, where κ > 0. Thus,
∂b∗(α,v,v)
∂v
≥ 0 if and only if ν(α, v, v) ≥ 0. Moreover, ∂ν(α,v,v)
∂v
= 2δ(v− v+α+ θα) > 0. Thus,
if ν(α, v, v′) ≥ 0, v′′ > v′ implies ν(α, v, v′′) > 0. We note ∂2ν(α,v,v)
∂α2
= −4δ(1 + θ) < 0, and
ν(0, v, v) = δ(v − v)2 ≥ 0 for all v ∈ [v, 0]. We obtain at most one strictly positive root,
α(v), which solves ν(α(v), v, v) = 0. Define α¯∗ ≡ α(v) and α¯∗ ≡ α(−s1). Suppose, first,
α < α¯∗. Then, ν(α, v, v) > 0 and thus ν(α, v, v) > 0 for all v > v. Suppose, second, α > α¯∗.
Then, ν(α, v,−s1) < 0 and thus ν(α, v, v) < 0 for all v < −s1. Finally, if α ∈ [α¯∗, α¯∗], then
ν(α, v, v) > 0, and ν(α, v,−s1) < 0. Since ν(α, v, v) is strictly increasing in v, we conclude
that there exists a unique threshold, v∗ ∈ [v,−s1], such that v < v∗ implies ν(α, v, v) < 0,
and v > v∗ implies ν(α, v, v) > 0. The complementary result for changes in v when
ve−v ≥ vF−s1, follows a similar argument. Suppose, instead, ve−v < vF−s1. We may write
∂bint(α,v,v)
∂v
= µ(α,v,v,δ,v
e)
κ
, where κ > 0. We show that if ve−v < vF −s1, then µ(α, v, v, δ, ve) <
0. We have ∂µ(α,v,v,δ,v
e)
∂v
= 2δ(v−v−2α), strictly decreasing in α. Substituting in Assumption
4 that ve+α > v+v
2
+vF−s1, i.e., α > v+v2 +vF−s1−ve yields ∂µ(α,v,v,δ,v
e)
∂v
< 0 if ve−v < vF−s1.
Assume this holds. Then, we must show that µ(α, v, v, δ, ve) < 0. µ(α, v, v, δ, ve) is linear
in δ, and µ(α, v, v, 0, ve) < 0, so it is sufficient to show that ve − v < vF − s1 implies
µ(α, v, v, 1, ve) < 0. This follows from µ(α, v, v, 1, ve) strictly increasing in ve and verifying
µ(α, v, v, 1, vF − s1 + v) < 0 by Assumption 3 that σ + v + s1 > 0.
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9. Supplemental Appendix: Extensions and Additional Results for “Reelection
and Renegotiation: The Political Economy of International Agreements”
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F. Electoral Competition with Platform Commitments.
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A. More Choices for Voters. Our base analysis supposes that domestic voters choose be-
tween a relatively friendly DG2 with valuation v, and a relatively hostile DG2 with valuation
v. In this extension, we instead allow voters to choose any DG2 with common knowledge
project valuation v2D ∈ [v, v]. For simplicity, we set w = 0, i.e., consider parties that are
purely policy-motivated. We impose structure on preferences that ensures that FG typically
values the project by more than DG2, and that there is sufficient variation in the domestic
preference shock λ that the joint surplus of FG and DG2 can become positive or negative:
Assumption A1: v < v¯ < vF , vF − s1 > 0, v + s1 < 0, σ > vF + v¯, −σ < v + s1.
Assumption A1 says that (1) on average, FG has a higher project valuation than friendly
DG1, and the relatively friendly DG1 has a higher project valuation than the relatively hos-
tile DG1, (2) that FG has a net positive relative value of the project at date 1 at the initial
terms s1 while either DG1 has a net negative relative value of the project at date 1 at the
initial terms s1; but (3) there is sufficient uncertainty about the common shock λ to domestic
preferences, that (a) it could exceed the expected surplus from the project between FG and
DG2 with valuation v¯ that is most friendly to the project; but, alternatively (b) it could be
even less than expected value to DG2 with valuation v that is most hostile to the project
from participating at the initial status quo s1. All other aspects of our model are unchanged.
Note that the analysis of date-2 policy outcomes is unchanged from our base setting. As in
the base setting, we assume v1D + s1 < 0.
We initially assume that v2D is exogenously drawn from cumulative distribution G(v
2
D)
on support [v, v], reflecting a benchmark in which the election outcome is insensitive to the
negotiation outcome. The expected lifetime payoff of a domestic agent with date-1 project
valuation v is:
(1− δ)r1(v + b1) + δ
v¯∫
v
σ∫
−σ
r2(v + b2 + λ) f(λ)dλ dG(v
′),
where f(λ) is the density of the domestic preference shock, λ. Here r1 ∈ {0, 1} is the date-1
domestic government’s initial decision to implement the project (r1 = 1) or not (r1 = 0);
and r2 denotes the project outcome at date 2; and b2 denotes the date-two transfer from FG
when the project is implemented at date 2, i.e., when r2 = 1. The analogous expected payoff
of FG with project valuation vF is:
(1− δ)r1(vF − b1) + δ
v¯∫
v
σ∫
−σ
r2(vF − b2) f(λ)dλ dG(v′).
By a direct extension of the date-2 analysis in the base setting, the expected date-2 payoff
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of a domestic agent with date-1 project valuation v is,
VD(v, s2) =
v¯∫
v
σ∫
−(v2D+s2)
(v + s2 + λ)f(λ) dλ dG(v
2
D)
+
v¯∫
v
−(v2D+s2)∫
−(v2D+vF )
(v − v2D + θ(v2D + λ+ vF ))f(λ) dλ dG(v2D). (31)
Likewise, the expected date-2 payoff of the foreign government FG with project valuation
vF given s2 is
VF (s2) =
v¯∫
v
σ∫
−(v2D+s2)
(vF − s2)f(λ) dλ dG(v2D)
+
v¯∫
v
(1− θ)
−(v2D+s2)∫
−(v2D+vF )
(v2D + λ+ vF )f(λ) dλ dG(v
2
D). (32)
At date 1, FG makes an offer b1 to the domestic government DG1 with valuation v
1
D. DG1
accepts the offer, i.e., r1(b1) = 1, if and only if:
(1− δ)(v1D + b1) + δVD(v1D, b1) ≥ δVD(v1D, s1). (33)
Thus, FG’s date-1 proposal solves:
max
b1≥s1
(1− δ)r1(b1)(vF − b1) + δVF (r1(b1)b1 + (1− r1(b1))s1),
subject to the participation constraint that r1(b1) = 1 if (33) holds, and r1(b1) = 0, otherwise.
We now extend Proposition 1 to a setting with a continuum of possible DG2 valuations. The
proof, along with proofs of all results stated in this section, appears at the end of this section.
Proposition A1. When the identity of the date-2 domestic government does not depend on
the date-1 agreement, the project is implemented at date 1 if and only if the date-1 surplus
is positive, i.e., v1D + vF ≥ 0. Further, if the project is implemented at date 1, the foreign
government extracts all surplus, offering the transfer that satisfies (33).
The intuition is precisely as in the base two-party setting: let ∆(v1D, s2) be the ex-ante ex-
pected date-2 surplus from the perspective of the date-1 bargaining parties, for any status
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quo s2:
∆(v1D, s2) = VD(v
1
D, s2) + VF (s2) =
v¯∫
v
σ∫
−(v2D+vF )
(v1D + λ+ vF )f(λ)dλ dG(v
2
D). (34)
When domestic power transitions are independent of the date-1 bargaining outcome, so too
is the date-2 surplus; and its division represents a pure conflict of interest between FG and
DG1. In particular, the total date-2 surplus arising from an agreement is no different than
the surplus in the event of disagreement: for any b1 ≥ 0,
∆(v1D, b1)−∆(v1D, s1) = 0.
Thus, the total surplus from an agreement at date 1 is unrelated to the date-1 terms:
(1− δ)(v1D + vF ) + ∆(v1D, b1)− ((1− δ)0 + ∆(v1D, s1)) = (1− δ)(v1D + vF ), (35)
which implies once again that static and dynamic conditions for a date-1 agreement coincide.
Endogenous Power Transitions. We endogenize the date-2 domestic government DG2 by
having a pivotal domestic voter with project valuation vpiv select her most preferred repre-
sentative, allowing the voter to choose any representative with valuation v2D ∈ [v, v¯], where
the bounds v and v¯ satisfy Assumption A1. This could reflect a setting with office-motivated
parties that can commit to the pivotal voter’s most-preferred platform.
When negotiating at date 1, the foreign and domestic governments may not perfectly
know the pivotal voter’s future preferences. We assume that, relative to the possible pref-
erences of the domestic electorate, the set of available representatives is sufficiently large.
We maintain the assumption that the pivotal voter’s valuation is uniformly drawn on the
interval [ve − α, ve + α], imposing the following restriction on the support:
Assumption A2: (1) ve − α− (vF − s1) > v and (2) ve + α < v¯ .
In conjunction with Lemma A1, below, Assumption A2 ensures that the project valuation
of the pivotal voter’s preferred date-2 representative is contained in (v, v¯).
Let VD(vpiv, v
2
D, s2) denote the domestic pivotal voter’s expected date-2 payoff when (1)
her project valuation is vpiv, (2) she appoints a date-2 domestic government DG2 whose
initial valuation is v2D, and (3) the status quo transfer is s2:
VD(vpiv, v
2
D, s2) =
σ∫
−(v2D+s2)
(vpiv +s2 +λ)f(λ) dλ+
−(v2D+s2)∫
−(v2D+vF )
(vpiv−v2D +θ(v2D +λ+vF ))f(λ) dλ.
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Given status quo agreement s2, the pivotal voter’s preferred date-1 representative solves:
max
v2D
VD(vpiv, v
2
D, s2).
With a uniform distribution over the preference shock, λ, the first-order condition yields:
Lemma A1. Given an inherited status quo agreement, s2 ≥ s1, the domestic pivotal voter’s
preferred date-2 representative values the project by
v2D(s2) = vpiv − (vF − s2). (36)
This result also applies in our benchmark setting, but in that context voters are constrained to
select between two parties. In the present setting, however, the pivotal voter is able to select
her most preferred DG2, which therefore varies smoothly with the first-period outcome s2.
We showed that when power transitions are exogenous, total expected surplus is unaf-
fected by the initial agreement. This is no longer true when date-1 outcomes alter the pivotal
voter’s preferred date-2 representative. To see why, recognize that from the perspective of
the date-1 bargaining parties, the expected date-2 surplus derived from a status quo of s2 is:
∆(v1D, s2) =
ve+α∫
ve−α
1
2α
σ∫
−v2D(s2)−vF
(v1D + λ+ vF )f(λ) dλ dvpiv
=
ve+α∫
ve−α
1
2α
σ∫
−vpiv−s2
(v1D + λ+ vF )f(λ) dλ dvpiv.
In contrast to when the election outcome is unresponsive to date-1 negotiations, the surplus
now indirectly depends on the negotiation outcome via its effect on the voter’s future choice of
representative. The relative total date-2 surplus from an agreement (versus no agreement) is:
∆(v1D, b1)−∆(v1D, s1) =
ve+α∫
ve−α
1
2α
−v2D(s1)−vF∫
−v2D(b1)−vF
(v1D + λ+ vF )f(λ) dλ dvpiv. (37)
Our next lemma highlights how conflicts between DG1, FG, and the domestic electorate
determine the expected future value of date-1 agreements. Recall that vepiv denotes the ex-
pectation of the pivotal voter’s future project valuation, from the perspective of the date-1
negotiating parties.
Lemma A2. The relative total date-2 surplus from an agreement is a single-peaked function
of the date-1 transfer b1, with unique maximum:
b∗ ≡ v1D + vF − ve, (38)
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and positive if and only if b1[s1, 2b
∗ − s1].
To understand the result, note that the transfer b1 that maximizes the expected date-2
surplus from an agreement (37) equates the expected project valuation of DG2 with that of
DG1. With uniform preference shocks, this transfer is b
∗. It constitutes the expected date-2
surplus between the date-1 domestic and foreign governments—i.e., their static alignment—
adjusted positively or negatively according to their degree of joint alignment relative to the
domestic electorate. It reflects two distinct dynamic conflicts of interest that determine the
effects of the date-1 outcome on expected date-2 surplus.
First, there is a dynamic conflict between FG and DG1, since the date-1 transfer deter-
mines the division of date-2 surplus. FG prefers to secure DG2’s participation in the project
with lower date-2 transfers, while the DG1 wants its successor to secure higher transfers.
The date-1 transfer also determines the size of the expected date-2 surplus. This creates
a second dynamic conflict between both governments and the domestic electorate. FG bene-
fits from more generous agreements, which steer the electorate in favor of appointing a more
pliant DG2. This imperative becomes more urgent when the pivotal voter is expected to be
more hostile, i.e., when ve is lower, raising its willingness to make more generous transfers.
In turn, DG1’s derived valuation of higher transfers depends on how it is aligned with the
domestic electorate.
If DG1 expects to view the project favorably relative to its electorate, i.e., if v
1
D − ve
is positive and large, this domestic mis-alignment raises the alignment between DG1 and
FG. In this case, both governments expect to gain from a larger transfer that steers voters
toward a less hostile successor that is more likely to preserve the agreement when the date-1
negotiating parties want it to survive.
If, instead, DG1 expects to be far more hostile to the project than its voters, i.e., if
v1D − ve is negative and large, the governments are in conflict over the attitude of the do-
mestic government’s successor. FG is less inclined to make generous offers, knowing that
the electorate is already likely to appoint a more project-friendly successor. Moreover, DG1
anticipates that higher offers will lead to a successor that is even more mis-aligned with
its own interests. This is because a more project-friendly successor will be less effective in
renegotiating revisions to the status quo, and will implement the project in circumstances
where DG1 would want to quit.
The scope for agreements to raise expected date-2 surplus thus hinges on the prospect
that DG1 may be replaced by a more hostile successor. If the date-1 negotiating parties
are aligned relative to the electorate, the expected date-2 surplus from agreement increases
relative to the date-1 surplus. In this case, a concern for date-2 outcomes may render agree-
ment possible in settings where negotiations would otherwise have failed, i.e., when the static
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Figure 3: Illustration of how the threshold v∗(ve, δ) varies with δ. Parameters: vF = 4.7, θ = .6, s1 = 0,
σ = 10. The dashed line represents v∗(ve, 0) = −vF : if and only if v1D ≥ v∗(ve, 0), agents who are concerned
only with date-1 outcomes will sign an agreement, implementing the project at date 2. In panel (a), more
concern for the future raises conflict, while in panel (b), more concern for the future lowers conflict.
date-1 surplus is negative. If the date-1 governments are instead mis-aligned relative to the
domestic electorate, the expected date-2 surplus from agreement decreases relative to the
static surplus. In this case, a concern for date-2 outcomes may render agreement impossible
in settings where negotiations would otherwise have succeeded, i.e., in settings where the
static surplus is positive.
Proposition A2. There exists a threshold v∗(ve, δ) < 0, strictly increasing in the expected
valuation of the domestic pivotal voter, ve, such that if and only if the date-one domestic
government is not too hostile to the project, i.e., v1D ≥ v∗(ve, δ), the foreign government’s
date-one transfer offer induces the domestic government to implement the project.
When the expected attitude of the domestic electorate becomes more favorable to the
project, the induced conflict between FG and DG1 grows. When δ rises, the consequences
of current negotiations for future surplus weigh more heavily on the considerations of both
negotiating governments. This may either raise or lower the conflict between them. Figure
3 illustrates two scenarios: one in which the pivotal voter is expected to view the project
very favorably, and one in which she is expected to view the project very unfavorably. The
dashed line indicates the valuation v∗(ve, 0) = −vF , the static valuation threshold for which
the governments reach a date-1 agreement.
In panel (a), the pivotal voter is likely to be very positively inclined toward the project,
and her desire to elect a friendly date-2 domestic government rises with increased transfers.
Relative to their static conflict of interest, the dynamic conflict between FG and DG1 sharp-
ens, so when they weigh date-2 outcomes more heavily, the threshold v∗(ve, δ) rises : concerns
for future outcomes reduce prospects for date-1 agreement. In panel (b), the pivotal voter
is expected to be very negatively inclined toward the project. FG is thus willing to make
large concessions in order to steer the voter toward a successor DG2 that will maintain the
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agreement. Relative to the static conflict of interest between FG and DG1, their dynamic con-
flict softens: as the governments grow more concerned with date-2 outcomes, the threshold
v∗(ve, δ) decreases : a concern for future outcomes raises the prospects of a date-1 agreement,
allowing even a statically mis-aligned FG and DG1 to implement the joint project.
15
Our benchmark showed that when election outcomes are unrelated to date-2 negotiations,
DG1 appropriates none of the expected discounted lifetime surplus from implementing the
project. In contrast, we now show that if election outcomes are responsive to negotiation
outcomes—if the support σ over domestic preference shocks λ is small enough that elec-
toral outcomes hinge sensitively on b1—and governments are sufficiently aligned, DG1 may
appropriate some of the surplus.
Proposition A3. When the support σ on domestic preference shocks λ is not too large,
the pivotal voter’s expected project valuation ve is not too large, and agents place sufficient
weight δ on date-two outcomes, there exists a threshold v∗∗(ve, δ) ∈ (v∗(ve, δ), 0) such that
if v1D ∈ [v∗(ve, δ), v∗∗(ve, δ)], FG offers the smallest date-one transfer that induces DG1 to
implement the project; but if v1D > v
∗∗(ve, δ), FG offers a strictly more generous date-one
transfer than is necessary to induce DG1 to implement it.
FG’s preferred offer b∗1 solves:
−δ
ve+α∫
ve−α
1
2α
θ(vF − b∗1)
∂
∂b1
F (−v2D(b1)− b1)|b1=b∗1 dvpiv − δ
ve+α∫
ve−α
1
2α
(1− F (−v2D(b∗1)− b∗1)) dvpiv
+ δ
ve+α∫
ve−α
1
2α
(1− θ)
−v2D(b∗1)−b∗1∫
−v2D(b∗1)−vF
∂v2D(b1)
∂b1
∣∣∣∣
b1=b∗1
f(λ) dλ dvpiv = 1− δ.
(39)
The left-hand side is the net date-2 marginal benefit of making a higher offer. The first term
captures the impact of increasing the extensive margin: raising the promised future payment
b1 increases the prospect that the initial offer will not be renegotiated because the unantic-
ipated preference shock λ now exceeds the expected renegotiation threshold of DG2 with
expected project valuation v2D(b1), −v2D(b1)− b1. The value to FG from a higher prospect of
an agreement is its share of the surplus, vF − b∗1 > 0. In the event of a subsequent (marginal)
renegotiation, FG cares only about those circumstances in which DG2 has the bargaining
power (which occurs with probability θ) as there is a discontinuous jump in what DG2 can
extract if it can credibly walk away. This provides an incentive for FG to raise its initial offer.
15The threshold v∗(ve, δ) is not, in general, monotonic in δ.
A-8
The second term—the intensive margin—reflects that raising an initial offer lowers FG’s
future payoff whenever the date-1 agreement persists at date 2, which occurs whenever the
unanticipated preference shock λ exceeds −v2D − b∗1. This intensive margin provides an in-
centive for FG to hold back from raising its initial offer.
The third term captures the change in FG’s date-2 payoff when it holds future bargaining
power (which occurs with probability 1−θ), and DG2 is prepared to walk away at the inher-
ited terms, but the surplus between the two governments is positive. Lemma 9 revealed that
more generous offers (i.e., higher b1) diminish the pivotal domestic voter’s desire to choose
a representative who is more hostile to the project. FG values a more project-friendly DG2
due to its less demanding participation constraint.
Finally, the right-hand side of (39) reflects the marginal cost of more generous offers, from
FG’s immediate (date-1) perspective. Substituting the uniform distribution, we re-write the
optimal date-1 transfer offer as
b∗1 =
δ(vF (2 + θ)− ve + σ)− 2σ
δ(3 + θ)
. (40)
The following is immediate.
Corollary A1. When the domestic pivotal voter is expected to be more opposed to the
project, i.e., when ve is more negative, or the probability θ that the date-2 domestic govern-
ment will hold bargaining power is higher, the foreign government’s optimal transfer b∗1 rises.
When the pivotal voter finds the project less attractive, so too will a future DG2 (via a
lower v2D(b1)). This means that FG faces a greater risk of renegotiation at date two. Because
raising the initial offer mitigates this risk by reducing the set of circumstances in which any
DG2 would wish to renegotiate, FG responds by offering more generous initial terms.
When DG2 is more likely to hold bargaining power, FG’s stakes from making a date-1
proposal that is unlikely to be renegotiated at date-2 rise—if DG2 is prepared to walk away
from the agreement, a higher θ raises the risk that she will appropriate the date-2 surplus.
This induces FG to make more generous offers, to reduce the likelihood of renegotiation.
Comparison with Two-Party Benchmark: If voters can freely choose the project valu-
ation of their date-2 government, the date-1 domestic government’s acceptance decision and
foreign government’s offer determine (a) whether the date-2 domestic government is more
or less hostile to the project than its predecessor, and (b) how much more or less hostile.
Lemma A2 showed how the prospect of a date-2 government that is more hostile than the
date-1 government is essential for larger transfers to increase the expected date-2 surplus
between the parties, relative to the static surplus.
In contrast, with two-party competition, where parties cannot commit to platforms that
they would not wish to implement, the hostile date-1 government can only be replaced by a
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strictly more project-friendly successor. Any change of power will therefore lead to a govern-
ment that is both less likely to successfully renegotiate terms, and more willing to implement
the project in cases where the hostile party wants to quit. This sharpens the conflict over
election outcomes to the point where there is no prospect of a mutually advantageous trans-
fer: any agreement that benefits the foreign government must harm the hostile domestic
government, and vice-versa. Moreover, any benefit to either government is outweighed by
the harm to the other. When there are only two political parties, what matters is not how
much more the hostile party is opposed to the project than the friendly party: just that the
hostile party is more opposed. These factors raise the risk that negotiations between the
relatively hostile domestic government and the foreign government fail at date 1 even when
the date-1 surplus from agreement is positive.
Proof of Proposition A1. We first verify necessary and sufficient conditions for the project
to be implemented at date 1. DG1’s relative value of agreement,
(1− δ)(v1D + b1) + δ(VD(v1D, b1)− VD(v1D, s1)) (41)
is convex in b1; δ ∈ [0, 1), and v1D + s1 < 0 implies there is at most one bD(v1D) ∈ (0, vF ]
such that DG1’s relative value of agreement is positive if and only if b1 ≥ bD(v1D). By a
similar argument, it can be shown that there exists bF ≤ vF such that FG’s relative value of
agreement is positive if and only if b1 ≤ bF ; therefore, a necessary and sufficient condition
for a date-1 agreement is bD(v
1
D) ≤ bF , which is equivalent to vF + v1D ≥ 0. This proves the
first claim. We next show that if v1D + vF ≥ 0, FG appropriates the total relative surplus
from an agreement. Fix DG1’s strategy r1(b1) = 1 if and only if b1 ≥ bD. FG prefers to make
an offer b1 > bD(v
1
D) if and only if
(1− δ)(vF − b1) + δVF (b1) ≥ (1− δ)(vF + v1D) + δVF (s1), (42)
while b1 > bD(v
1
D) implies that DG1 strictly prefers to accept:
(1− δ)(v1D + b1) + δVD(v1D, b1) > δVD(v1D, s1). (43)
Letting ∆(v1D) =
∫ v¯
v
∫ σ
−(v2D+vF )
(v2D +λ+ vF )f(λ) dλ dG(v
2
D), (43) can be written (1− δ)(v1D +
b1) + δ∆(v
1
D) − δVF (b1) > δ∆(v1D) − δVF (s1). Combining this with (42) yields δ(VF (b1) −
VF (s1)) < (1− δ)(v1D + b1) ≤ δ(VF (b1)− VF (s1)), a contradiction. 
Proof of Lemma A1. Immediate after substituting λ ∼ U [−σ, σ]. 
A-10
Proof of Proposition A2. The expected date-2 payoff to DG1 with valuation v
1
D is:
VD(v
1
D, s2) =
∫ ve+α
ve−α
1
2α
∫ σ
−(v2D(s2)+s2)
(v + λ+ s2)f(λ) dλ dvpiv (44)
+
∫ ve+α
ve−α
1
2α
∫ −(v2D(s2)+s2)
−(v2D(s2)+vF )
(v − v2D(s2) + θ(v2D(s2) + λ+ vF ))f(λ) dλ dvpiv.
DG1 prefers r1(b1) = 1 if and only if (1 − δ)(v1D + b1) + δVD(v1D, b1) − δVD(v1D, s2) ≥ 0,
where this relative value is: (i) convex in b1, (ii) strictly negative evaluated at b1 = 0 for
δ ∈ [0, 1), (iii) strictly increasing in v1D and (iv) constant in ve. Thus, there is at most one
bD(v
1
D, δ) ∈ (0, vF ] such that this relative value is weakly positive if and only if b1 ≥ bD.
Likewise, the expected date-2 payoff to FG from standing offer s2 is:
VF (s2) =
∫ ve+α
ve−α
1
2α
∫ σ
−(v1D(s2)+s2)
(vF − s2)f(λ) dλ dvpiv
+
∫ ve+α
ve−α
1
2α
(1− θ) ∫ −(v1D(s2)+s2)−(v1D(s2)+vF )(vF + v1D(s2) + λ)f(λ) dλ dvpiv. (45)
If r1(b1) = 1, the foreign government’s date-1 relative value of agreement is (1 − δ)(vF −
b1) + δ(VF (b1) − VF (s1)), where this value is (v) concave in b1, (vi) strictly positive eval-
uated at b1 = s1, (vii) weakly negative evaluated at b1 = vF , (viii) strictly decreases in
ve ≡ E[vpiv], and (ix) constant in v1D. We conclude that there exists bF (ve, δ) ∈ (s1, vF ],
such FG’s relative value of agreement is positive if and only if b1 ≤ bF . Combining
(iii), (ix), bD(min{12vF θ − σ,−vF}, δ) ≥ vF ≥ bF (ve, δ), and (by straightforward algebra)
bD(−s1, δ) < bF (ve, δ) yields v∗(δ, ve) < 0 such that bD(v1D, δ) ≤ bF (ve, δ) if and only if
v1D ≥ v∗, where v∗(δ, ve) increases in ve by (iv) and (viii).
We now prove the second part. Let b∗1 denote FG’s most-preferred date-1 transfer
b1, i.e., expression (40). b
∗
1 strictly increases in δ and b
∗
1 > 0 if and only if δ > δ
∗ ≡
2σ
vF (2+θ)+σ−ve−s1(3+θ) , where δ
∗ < 1 if and only if σ < vF (1 + θ) − s1(3 + θ) + vF − ve ≡ σˆ.
Suppose, then, σ < σˆ. DG1’s expected relative payoff from choosing r1(b
∗
1) = 1 is contin-
uous and strictly increasing in v1D; evaluated at v
1
D = −s1, its expected relative payoff is
(1 − δ)(−s1 + b∗1) + δ(VD(−s1, b∗1) − VD(−s1,−s1)), which is strictly concave in δ; straight-
forward algebra yields two roots: δ∗ and δ′ > δ∗. We have shown σ < σˆ implies δ∗ < 1. We
have δ′ ≥ 1 if ve ≤ s1θ(θ+3)−vF (θ
2+4θ+2)+σ(θ+4)
θ+2
. 
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B. Domestic Pivotal Voter May Benefit From Limited Choice. We compare the
domestic pivotal voter’s payoffs in negotiation outcomes in two settings—one in which she
can choose any date-2 representative, and one in which she is forced to select either the
friendly party (with valuation v) or the hostile party (with valuation v). We show how the
pivotal voter may benefit from being constrained. We suppose that the pivotal voter at date
1 has project valuation ve, and anticipates that her interim valuation (between dates 1 and
2) is vpiv, drawn uniformly from [v
e−α, ve+α]. We evaluate her date-1 (total discounted) ex-
pected payoffs.16 To fix ideas, suppose the date-1 domestic government has project valuation
v, and we set w = 0.
When the pivotal voter may freely select her date-2 representative, the previous section
of this Supplemental Appendix showed that her most-preferred representative solves:
max
v2D∈R
V (vpiv, v
2
D, s2) (46)
where
V (v, v2D, s2) =
σ∫
−(v2D+s2)
(v + λ+ s2)f(λ) dλ+
−(v2D+s2)∫
−(v2D+vF )
(v − v2D + θ(v2D + λ+ vF ))f(λ) dλ.
We learn from Lemma 9 that the unique solution to (46) is:
vˆ(s2) = vpiv − (vF − s2). (47)
By contrast, when the pivotal voter must choose between the friendly and hostile party, her
most-preferred date-2 representative solves
max
v2D∈{v,v}
V (vpiv, v
2
D, s2). (48)
Thus the pivotal voter votes for the hostile party if and only if
vpiv ≤ v + v
2
+ (vF − s2). (49)
Suppose that parameters are such that, in both settings, DG1 with valuation v and FG
implement the project at a transfer b1 that satisfies DG1’s participation constraint (we will
verify that this is true for the example). Let bNC1 denote the transfer when the pivotal voter
16An alternative approach would be to evaluate the welfare of a date-1 voter that is distinct from the
pivotal voter in between dates 1 and 2. This approach yields qualitatively similar results.
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freely selects her date-1 representative (“No Constraint”). Thus, bNC1 solves
(1−δ)(v+bNC1 )+δ
ve+α∫
ve−α
1
2α
VD(v, vpiv−(vF−bNC1 ), bNC1 ) dvpiv = δ
ve+α∫
ve−α
1
2α
VD(v, vpiv−vF , s1) dvpiv.
With constrained choice between two parties, the transfer b1 that solves the date-1 domestic
government’s participation constraint, bC1 (“Constraint”) solves:
(1− δ)(v + bC1 ) + δ
v+v
2
+vF−bC1∫
ve−α
1
2α
VD(v, v, b
C
1 ) dvpiv + δ
ve+α∫
v+v
2
+vF−bC1
1
2α
VD(v, v, b
C
1 ) dvpiv
= (1− δ)0 + δ
v+v
2
+vF−s1∫
ve−α
1
2α
VD(v, v, s1) dvpiv + δ
ve+α∫
v+v
2
+vF−s1
1
2α
VD(v, v, s1) dvpiv.
(50)
The domestic pivotal voter’s date-1 expected payoff in the setting with no constraints on her
choice of date-2 representative is therefore:
(1− δ)(ve + bNC1 ) + δ
ve+α∫
ve−α
1
2α
VD(vpiv, vpiv − (vF − bNC1 ), bNC1 ) dvpiv, (51)
while her corresponding payoff in the setting with constrained choice is:
(1−δ)(ve+bC1 )+δ
v+v
2
+vF−bC1∫
ve−α
1
2α
VD(vpiv, v, b
C
1 ) dvpiv+δ
ve+α∫
v+v
2
+vF−bC1
1
2α
VD(vpiv, v, b
C
1 ) dvpiv. (52)
Expression (52) is greater than (51) if and only if:
bC1 − bNC1 ≥
δ
1− δ
v+v
2
+vF−bC1∫
ve−α
1
2α
(
VD(vpiv, vpiv − (vF − bNC1 ), bNC1 )− VD(vpiv, v, bC1 )
)
dvpiv
+
δ
1− δ
ve+α∫
v+v
2
+vF−bC1
1
2α
(
VD(vpiv, vpiv − (vF − bNC1 ), bNC1 )− VD(vpiv, v, bC1 )
)
dvpiv.
(53)
If the transfers across each setting were the same, i.e., bC1 = b
NC
1 , the inequality is never satis-
fied: the voter simply sacrifices the flexibility to fine-tune her choice of date-2 representative.
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More generally, the domestic voter expects to benefit only if the transfer bC1 is sufficiently
large relative to bNC1 to compensate for her diminished flexibility in appointing the date-2
representative. This transfer bC1 can exceed b
NC
1 because the foreign government recognizes
an increased threat of facing a very hostile date-2 government—even if a moderate voter
would prefer to elect only a modestly hostile date-2 government, the lack of choice may force
her to ‘overshoot’ in favor of a far more hostile representative. This, in turn, acts as a source
of discipline on date-1 negotiations, from which the pivotal voter may expect to benefit.
We now illustrate conditions under which (53) holds for a set of benchmark parameters.
We fix vF = 4, σ = 8.3, θ = 1, δ = .7, v = −6, s1 = 0, and α = 2.5, leaving ve and v as free
parameters. The shaded area of Figure 4 identifies pairs (ve, v) for which the inequality (53)
is satisfied.
-1.5 -1.4 -1.3 -1.2 -1.1 -1.0
-1.0
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
vpiv
e
v
Figure 4: The shaded area denotes pairs (ve, v) such that domestic pivotal voter prefers a system of limited
choice, i.e., expression (53) holds. Parameters: δ = .7, vF = 4, θ = 1, σ = 8.3, v = −6, s1 = 0, and α = 2.5.
Fixing the project valuation of the friendly party v, i.e., DG1, the pivotal voter is more
likely to prefer a system of limited choice when she is relatively more hostile, i.e., when ve
is lower. A more hostile pivotal voter can more credibly threaten to revert from the friendly
party to the hostile party, even though the hostile party may be significantly more opposed
to the project than the pivotal voter’s most preferred representative. This exerts discipline
on FG’s initial offer, raising its date-1 transfer.
Fixing the pivotal voter’s date-1 (and anticipated date-2) valuation ve, the pivotal voter is
also more likely to prefer a system of limited choice when the friendly party values the project
by less, i.e., when v is more negative. To see why, consider a friendly DG1’s decision to accept
or reject an offer from FG in the two-party setting. When v is large relative to v, the friendly
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party—like FG—is concerned that the hostile party will win office. This makes the friendly
party more willing to accept less generous offers, because it is more likely to retain office
on the basis of any status quo transfer b1 than a status quo of zero. Anticipating this, FG
makes worse offers, from which the pivotal voter suffers. When, instead, the friendly party is
more hostile—i.e., whenv is lower—its bargaining position is strengthened by its increased
intrinsic congruence with its potential replacement. This forces FG to extend more generous
transfers in order to induce the date-1 friendly government’s participation in the project.
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C. Retrospective Voters. With forward-looking voters, their induced preferences over rep-
resentatives at the end of date 1 reflect their assessments of which party will best serve their
interests at date 2. This creates a commitment problem: voters cannot credibly promise to
reward a date-1 incumbent for securing better transfers at date 1. This problem is especially
severe for an incumbent who is fundamentally opposed to the project: under prospective
voting, securing more generous concessions in return for implementing the project at date 1
unambiguously harms its prospect of being returned to office at date 1.
Suppose, instead, that voters are retrospective: they reward or punish incumbents based
solely on their date-1 payoffs. To highlight the consequences of this behavior, we suppose
that a pivotal domestic voter with valuation vpiv uniformly drawn on [v
e−α, ve +α] reelects
the date-1 incumbent according to a reward schedule that is linear and increasing in her
date-1 payoff:
R(r1(vpiv + b1)) = max{0,min{a+ βr1(vpiv + b1), 1}},
where a, β ≥ 0, and as before r1 ∈ {0, 1} is the indicator taking the value 1 if the date-1
project is implemented. We assume ve + vF > 0, and to avoid unedifying cases, we scale a
and β > 0 so that a+βve > 0 and a+β(ve+vF ) < 1. The parameter β captures the salience
of the international negotiation in the domestic elections. For simplicity, we fix s1 = 0, so
that s2 = r1b1. FG’s offer to a date-1 domestic government with valuation v ∈ {v, v} solves:
max
b1≥0
(1− δ)r1(b1)(vF − b1)+δR(r1(ve + b1))VF (v, b1r1(b1))
+δ(1−R(r1(ve + b1)))VF (v′, b1r1(b1)), (54)
subject to the date-1 domestic government’s participation constraint that r1(b1) = 1 if and
only if:
(1− δ)(v1D + b1) + δR(ve + b1)[VD(v1D, v, b1) + w] + (1−R(ve + b1))VD(v1D, v′, b1)
≥ δR(0)[VD(v1D, v, 0) + w] + (1−R(0))VD(v1D, v′, 0), (55)
where v′ is the valuation of the party that does not hold date-1 domestic power. We establish
an analogue to Proposition 2, providing conditions under which a hostile incumbent either
fails to secure an initial agreement, or is instead held to its participation constraint.
Proposition C1. Consider retrospective voting and suppose that the hostile party holds
domestic office at date 1. Then, for any δ > 0, if international negotiations are sufficiently
salient in the election and the parties are sufficiently polarized in the sense that
β(v − v) > 1 + θ
2
, (56)
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then either (1) no agreement is signed, or (2) the agreement is the smallest that secures the
hostile government’s participation, i.e., satisfies (55).
If voters are forward -looking, the primary obstacle to an agreement between a foreign gov-
ernment and a hostile domestic incumbent is the electoral interest of the hostile incum-
bent: securing a more generous agreement raises the prospect that a hostile government is
subsequently replaced with a friendly government. So, even in settings where the foreign
government would be prepared to make positive—and possibly large—transfers, the hostile
domestic government would prefer to reject these offers.
In contrast, if voters are backward -looking, the primary obstacle to an agreement between
a foreign government and a hostile domestic incumbent is the induced electoral interest of
the foreign government: more generous offers now raise the prospect that a hostile date-1
incumbent retains power. Less generous offers worsen the payoff of the pivotal domestic
voter, who punishes the incumbent with replacement. This incentivizes FG to hold back
from offering higher transfers in exchange for an initial agreement. The conflict of interest
between FG and a hostile domestic incumbent grows as (1) the election outcome becomes
more responsive to date-1 outcomes (i.e., β increases) and (2) FG’s value from ensuring the
fall of the incumbent rises (i.e., v − v rises).
Thus, the conflict of interest between the foreign government and the hostile party is
fundamental, and does not hinge on the farsightedness of the electorate.
Suppose, instead, that DG1 is friendly. With forward-looking voters, more generous initial
agreements help the friendly incumbent to remain in power, since voters’ induced preferences
over date-2 negotiators revert in favor of maintaining the agreement, rather than improving
it. With retrospective voting, more generous initial agreements help the friendly incumbent
to remain in power. This raises the stakes for FG, encouraging it to make relatively more gen-
erous offers to the friendly incumbent than it would prefer to make to a hostile government.
In contrast to settings with prospective voters, a friendly domestic incumbent government
may secure more generous initial terms than a hostile incumbent under retrospective voting.
Corollary C1. For any δ > 0, if β(v − v) > 1+θ
2
, there exists w¯ such that if w > w¯ (office-
holding motives are sufficiently strong), a date-1 friendly government that derives a strictly
positive surplus from the foreign government’s initial offer extracts strictly higher transfers
from the foreign government than would be obtained by a hostile domestic government.
When the election outcome is responsive to the date-1 outcome, the conflict between the
foreign government and a hostile domestic government increases. So, too, the congruence
between the foreign government and the friendly domestic government increases. In order
to promote the reelection of a friendly government, the foreign government makes strictly
more generous offers than it would make to a hostile government.
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When β(v− v) > 1+θ
2
, any agreement between FG and hostile DG1 involves the smallest
possible transfer that induces the hostile government’s participation. With retrospective
voting, DG1 enjoys a higher prospect of reelection whenever the transfer from the foreign
government gives the (expected) pivotal voter a strictly higher value from the project than
from no project, i.e., ve + b1 > 0. In contrast with prospective voting, this is true regardless
of the identity of DG1. As office-holding motives become overwhelmingly important for the
domestic political parties, they become more willing to accept any agreement that increases
their chances of reelection, which implies that their participation constraints converge. Thus,
when w > 0 is sufficiently large, whenever the friendly government receives a strictly positive
rent, i.e., a transfer that strictly exceeds the minimum required to induce its participation
(note: FG’s objective is strictly concave, and an interior solution does not depend on w),
a hostile DG1 that secures only that needed to induce its participation must receive a less
generous offer. And since FG values the reelection of friendly DG1—which is achieved with
larger offers—there are primitives for which its most preferred offer is strictly larger than that
needed to secure the friendly government’s participation. Note that the conditions in the
Corollary are sufficient, but not necessary, for the friendly party to secure a higher transfer.
Proof of Proposition C1. When (56) holds, the difference between the LHS and the RHS
of hostile DG1’s participation constraint (55) is strictly concave and strictly increasing in b1.
Hence, there is at most one bD(v, w) ∈ (0, vF ] such that r1(b1) = 1 if and only if b1 ≥ bD(v, w).
Condition (56) further implies that the foreign government’s relative value of agreement at
date-1 with transfer b1 is strictly convex in b1, strictly positive evaluated at b1 = 0, and
strictly negative evaluated at b1 = vF . Hence, there is a unique bF > 0 such that the for-
eign government’s relative value of agreement at date-1 with transfer b1 is weakly positive
if and only if b1 ≤ bF , and that its relative value is strictly decreasing in b1 ∈ [0, bF ]. Thus,
bD(v, w) > bF implies no agreement is signed at date 1. If, instead, bD(v, w) ≤ bF any offer
b1 > bD(v, w) is strictly dominated for the foreign government by an offer b
′
1 ∈ (bD(v, w), b1).
Thus, we must have b1 = bD(v, w) and r1(b1) = 1 if and only if b1 ≥ bD(v, w). 
Proof of Corollary C1. By the previous proposition, if β(v− v) > 1+θ
2
, and an agreement
is reached with hostile DG1, it is the smallest offer that satisfies hostile DG1’s participation
constraint, i.e., bD(v, w). It is easy to verify that (1) limw→∞ |bD(v, w) − bD(v, w)| = 0,
where bD(v, w) is the corresponding transfer that solves friendly DG1’s participation con-
straint, and (2) FG’s objective (54) evaluated at v = v and v′ = v is strictly concave in
b1. Thus for any transfer b
∗(v) that solves the associated first-order condition and further
satisfies b∗(v) > bD1 (v, w), w sufficiently large also implies that b
∗(v) > bD1 (v, w). 
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D. Domestic Politics and Prospects for Long-Term Agreements. In our core, two-
party setting, suppose that the hostile party grows less opposed to the project in the sense
that v increases. Does this imply that the prospect of a successful negotiation at the (ter-
minal) date 2 increases? We now show that the answer may be no.
The probability that the project is implemented at date 2 given status quo offer b1 ≥ s1 is:
Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b1))(1− F (−(v + vF ))) + Pr(vmed > vˆ(b1))(1− F (−(v + vF )). (57)
If vmed ≤ vˆ(b1), the pivotal voter wants to elect the party that is hostile. The project will
then be implemented so long as the date-2 surplus is positive, i.e., as long as v+λ+ vF ≥ 0,
which occurs with probability 1− F (−(v + vF )). If, instead, vmed > vˆ(b1), the pivotal voter
wants to elect the party that is friendly to the project, in which case the project will be
implemented so long as v + λ+ vF ≥ 0, which occurs with probability 1− F (−(v + vF )).
Conditional on the identity of the date-2 domestic government, the transfer b1 does not
affect whether the project is implemented. This is because implementation only depends on
whether the realized date-2 joint surplus is positive and not on the status quo transfer.
This transfer, nonetheless, has an indirect impact on date-2 outcomes via its impact
on whether the hostile or friendly party is elected. In turn, changes in primitives such as
the ideologies of the domestic political parties exert both direct and indirect effects on the
prospects of a date-1 project. The direct effects arise from changes in how each party be-
haves in office, conditional on being elected. The indirect effects arise from changes in the
foreign government’s incentives that determine its initial date-1 proposal, and any effects on
the pivotal voter’s subsequent electoral choice.
Suppose that DG1 is friendly, and that the initial offer, b
∗
1, satisfies the first-order con-
dition associated with FG’s objective function, and suppose r1(b
∗
1) = 1. Let P (vˆ(b1)) =
Pr(vmed ≤ vˆ(b∗1)) denote the probability that the hostile party is elected in between dates 1
and 2. The derivative of the probability of a date-2 agreement (57) with respect to v is:
P (vˆ(b∗1))f(−(v + vF ))
− ∂P (vˆ)
∂vˆ
∣∣∣∣
vˆ=vˆ(b∗1)
(
∂vˆ(b∗1)
∂v
+
∂vˆ(b1)
∂b
∣∣∣∣
b1=b∗1
db∗1
dv
)
(F (−(v + vF ))− F (−(v + vF ))).
(58)
The first component represents the direct effect of a moderation by the hostile party. With
probability P (vˆ(b∗1)), the hostile party holds office at date 1. For a fixed prospect that it holds
power, a higher v raises the prospect of an agreement by expanding the set of circumstances
in which the date-2 bargaining surplus between FG and DG2 is positive, i.e., vF + v+λ ≥ 0.
The second part of the expression captures two indirect effects, each of which operates via its
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Figure 5: How the probability of a date-2 agreement changes when the hostile party becomes more favorable
to reform. Parameters are: v = 0, σ = .8, vF = .8, v
e = .3, δ = 1, θ = 1, w = 1, s1 = 0 and α =
1
2 .
consequences for the relative prospect that the hostile party holds political power at date 2.
First, when the hostile party becomes more favorably disposed to the project—i.e., when
v increases—the hostile party becomes more electorally competitive, since it has moved closer
to the friendly party, capturing some of its voters. This is captured by the term
∂vˆ(b∗1)
∂v
= 1
2
, im-
plying that the identity of the voter who is indifferent between the friendly and hostile parties,
vˆ, shifts upward. Second, as Proposition 5 established, the foreign government’s preferred
offer changes. If its preferred offer falls, this further advantages the hostile party, electorally,
by rendering it relatively valuable as an instrument for achieving more future concessions,
since ∂vˆ(b1)
∂b1
< 0. Even a higher offer from the foreign government may not be enough to
outweigh the direct loss of domestic electoral competitiveness suffered by the friendly party.
With uniform uncertainty over the domestic preference shock (λ) and the pivotal voter
(vmed), (58) simplifies to
1
(2α)(2σ)
(
vˆ(b∗1)− (ve − α)−
(
1
2
− db
∗
1
dv
)
(v − v)
)
.
The indirect effects that push in favor of a reduced prospect that the project is implemented
at date 2 are more likely to dominate when the hostile party is initially on the electoral fringe,
i.e., when P (vˆ(b∗1)) is small. In turn, this is more likely when (1) the gap v − v is large and
(2) ve is not too negative. A higher v− v incentivizes the foreign government to make more
generous offers, raising b∗1 and thus lowering P (vˆ(b
∗
1)), while a more pro-project anticipated
pivotal voter is primitively more aligned with the friendly party.
Figure 5 illustrates how these effects may resolve: when the hostile party is initially very
opposed to the project relative to expected public opinion, it is also electorally marginal.
Then, a moderation of its position first works via its improved electoral prospects to reduce
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the prospect of a date-2 agreement. Eventually, though, increased softening of the hostile
party’s stance raises the prospect of agreement via its impact when the hostile party wins
office. A related result can obtain for changes in the friendly party’s preferences: raising
its already relatively favorable attitude toward the project (v) may reduce the prospect of
a long-term agreement by pushing voters toward the hostile party, raising the prospect that
the hostile party holds office.
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E. Domestic Government Holds Date-1 Bargaining Power. In our benchmark pre-
sentation, we assume that at date 1 the foreign government is the proposer and the domestic
government is the receiver. We now show how results change if, instead DG1 is the proposer.
Exogenous Transitions. Consider, first, the setting in which the identity of the date-2 do-
mestic government does not depend on the date-1 negotiation outcome.
Proposition E1. (Domestic Government Makes Date-1 Offer). When the identity of the
date-2 domestic representative does not depend on the date-1 agreement, the project is im-
plemented at date 1 if and only if the date- surplus is positive, i.e., v1D + vF ≥ 0. Further, if
the project is implemented at date 1, the domestic government extracts all surplus.
Proof of Proposition E1. The case δ = 0 is trivial. Consider δ > 0, in the remainder of
the proof. DG1’s relative value from an agreement with transfer b1 is
(1− δ)(v1D + b1) + δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)
[
1[v2D = v
1
D]w + VD(v
1
D, v
2
D, b1)
]
−(1− δ)0 − δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)
[
1[v2D = v
1
D]w + VD(v
1
D, v
2
D, s1)
]
. (59)
This expression is strictly convex in b1 ≥ s1, and strictly negative evaluated at b1 = s1 for
any δ ∈ [0, 1) under Assumptions 1 and 2, so that there exists at most one bD(v1D) > s1 such
that (5) is weakly positive if and only if b1 ≥ bD(v1D) . Likewise, FG’s relative value of an
agreement with transfer b1 is
(1− δ)(vF − b1) + δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)VF (v
2
D, b1)− (1− δ)0− δ
∑
v2D∈{v,v}
Pr(v2D)VF (v
2
D, s1), (60)
which is strictly concave, and which it is easy to show admits a unique bF ∈ (s1, vF ) such
that (60) is non-negative if and only if b1 ≤ bF . We conclude that a transfer that gener-
ates a weakly positive relative value of agreement for both DG1 and FG exists if and only if
bD(v
1
D) ≤ bF , which is equivalent to (1−δ)(v1D+vF ). Since (59) is strictly convex, for any δ >
0, DG1’s value from an agreement with transfer b1 is strictly increasing in b1 ≥ bD(v1D), so that
DG1’s optimal offer whenever bD(v
1
D) ≤ bF is bF , i.e., the transfer equating (60) with zero. 
Endogenous Transitions. Consider, now, the setting in which the domestic pivotal voter
freely chooses the identity of her date-2 domestic government. We extend Propositions 3
and 2 to a setting in which the domestic government makes the date-1 offer.
Proposition E2 (Domestic Government Makes Date-1 Offer). Suppose DG1 makes the
date-1 offer to FG. If DG1 is friendly, parts (1) and (2) of Proposition 3 apply; moreover,
whenever a date-1 agreement is signed, friendly DG1 retains all of the surplus from agree-
ment. If DG1 is hostile, parts (1) and (2) of Proposition 2 apply; moreover, whenever a
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date-1 agreement is signed, hostile DG1 retains all of the surplus from agreement.
Proof of Proposition E2. Straightforward extension of Proposition E1. 
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F. Electoral Competition with Platform Commitments.17 Our benchmark presen-
tation assumes that the parties cannot commit to their bargaining postures between dates.
That is, the friendly party is pre-committed to negotiating with bargaining posture v at date
2, and the hostile party is pre-committed to bargaining posture v.
We now rmodify this assumption by supposing that, between dates 1 and 2 but before vmed
is realized, the friendly and hostile parties simultaneously commit to bargaining postures (i.e.,
‘platforms’) v ∈ [vL, vH ]. The interpretation is that, if elected, a party that commits to a bar-
gaining posture v will negotiate as if it had intrinsic value v. A bargaining posture thus serves
as an electoral platform. We do not derive date-1 negotiation outcomes, focusing instead on
the strategic platform choices of parties between dates 1 and 2 for a given status quo s2.
We assume vL < v < v < vH , and for simplicity, we set w = 0, i.e., we focus on a setting
in which parties are purely policy-motivated. The assumption vL < v allows the hostile
party with value v to commit to a bargaining posture that is more hostile than its intrinsic
attitude to the project, and the assumption vH > v allows the friendly party with value v
to commit to a bargaining posture that is more friendly than its intrinsic attitude to the
project. We extend Assumption 1 by assuming that there is sufficient uncertainty about
the preference shock, λ, by assuming σ > vF + vH and −σ < vL. Finally, we assume that
ve ∈ (v, v), i.e., the median voter’s expected value from the project lies stricly between the
project values of the two polarized parties.
Proposition F1. Given a status quo s2, the hostile party commits to a platform v
′ and the
friendly party commits to a platform v′ satisfying:
v − (vF − s2) < v′ < v′ < v − (vF − s2). (61)
A precise characterization of the platforms is given in the proof. To interpret the con-
ditions in (61), recall that when the status quo offer is s2, the most preferred negotiating
posture of a party with value v ∈ {v, v} in between dates is v − (vF − s2). The proposition
reveals that electoral competition induces each party to moderate its platform to trade off
its intrinsic policy preferences with its desire to attract the support of the electorate. Figure
6 illustrates equilibrium platforms for a context in which the hostile party’s value v and the
friendly party’s value v are located on opposite sides of, and equidistant from the expected
pivotal voter’s value ve. The parties commit to bargaining postures that are equidistant
from the expected pivotal voter’s most preferred bargaining posture ve − (vF − s2).
Proof of Proposition F1. We have that for any platforms v and v′, satisfying v < v′, the
17We thank Gilat Levy, who encouraged us to consider this extension.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium bargaining postures for the friendly (blue) and hostile (red) parties, with the expected
location of the pivotal voter’s most preferred bargaining posture (dashed), as a function of the date-2 status
quo transfer s2. Parameters are: v = 0, v = −3, ve = −1.5, vF = 4, σ = 8, δ ∈ [0, 1], θ = 1 and α = 8.
probability with which the party offering platform v is elected is:
P (v, v′, s2) =
v+v′
2
+vF−s2∫
ve−α
1
2α
dvmed. (62)
We first claim that in equilibrium, the hostile party with value v chooses a platform v′ and the
friendly party with value v chooses a platform v′ satisfying v′ ≤ v′. Suppose, to the contrary,
that there exists an equilibrium in which v′ > v′. If v′ > max{v − (vF − s2), v′}, the hostile
party can profitably deviate to max{v − (vF − s2), v′}. Thus, v′ ≤ max{v′, v − (vF − s2)}.
This, together with the supposition v′ > v′, yields v′ < v − (vF − s2). However, this implies
that the friendly party can profitably deviate to platform v − (vF − s2). Therefore, in equi-
librium, v′ ≤ v′. Similarly, it is easy to show that v − (vF − s2) ≤ v′ and v′ ≤ v − (vF − s2).
Therefore, in equilibrium, the platform v′ chosen by hostile party with value v solves
max
v′∈[vL,vH ]
P (v′, v′, s2)VD(v, v′, s2)) + (1− P (v′, v′, s2))VD(v, v′, s2), (63)
where
VD(v, v˜, s2) =
σ∫
−(v˜+s2)
(v + s2 + λ)f(λ) dλ+
−(v˜+s2)∫
−(v˜+vF )
(v − v˜ + θ(v˜ + λ+ vF ))f(λ) dλ, (64)
is the expected date-2 payoff of a domestic agent with value v when DG2 negotiates with
bargaining posture v˜—i.e., its strategy is the one that would be chosen by an agent with
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intrinsic value v˜. Similarly, the platform v¯′ of the friendly party with value v solves
max
v′∈[vL,vH ]
P (v′, v′, s2)VD(v, v′, s2) + (1− P (v′, v′, s2))VD(v, v′, s2). (65)
The first-order condition for v′ is:
1
2α
1
2
(VD(v, v
′, s2)− VD(v, v′, s2)) + P (v′, v′, s2)∂VD(v, v
′, s2)
∂v′
= 0. (66)
which defines a unique (interior) solution if
1
2α
∂VD(v, v
′, s2)
∂v′
+ P (v′, v′, s2)
∂2VD(v, v
′, s2)
∂v′2
< 0, (67)
where the inequality follows from (1) v′ ≥ v− (vF − s2) and (2) V (v, v˜, s2) is strictly concave
in v˜. Similarly, the first-order condition
1
2α
1
2
(VD(v, v
′, s2)− VD(v, v′, s2)) + (1− P (v′, v′, s2))∂VD(v, v
′, s2)
∂v′
= 0, (68)
characterizes the unique interior solution for the friendly party’s platform choice v′. It follows
that an equilibrium exists and—by inspection of the first-order conditions—is characterized
by a pair (v′, v′) such that (1) v − (vF − s2) < v′ < v′ < v − (vF − s2) and (2) (v′, v′)
simultaneously satisfy (66) and (68). 
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